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ABSTRACT
In contrast to the current political science literature on Congress, this thesis
argues that the reelectability of Congressmen is not damaged when military bases
in their districts are closed. According to Mayhew, Lindsay, and other scholars,
members of Congress must prevent their bases from being closed or face "great
electoral jeopardy." Nevertheless, beginning in 1987, legislators created a process
that was designed to facilitate base closures. Why would they engage in such
apparently suicidal behavior? Have voters actually punished the legislators that
suffered base closures in their districts, as Mayhew and others would predict?
After examining the Congressional election returns from 1990 and 1992,
which followed the base closure rounds of 1989 and 1991, respectively, this thesis
found that base closure has no effect on the reelectability of members of Congress.
What accounts for this finding? Although bases often do provide important
economic benefits for Congressional districts, and would therefore be expected to
be of critical concern to voters, Congress designed a base closure system that
insulated legislators from blame if bases were closed in their own districts. The
success of this "blame-proof" system has important implications for the future of
the base-closing process and the larger question of how, and under what
circumstances, Congress delegates power to the President.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
By 1987, a growing number of Congressmen had concluded that unnecessary
military facilities ought to be closed to help cut the Federal budget deficit.
However, what makes sense for the nation is not always attractive to the voters
in a particular Congressional district, or to the Member who represents them in
Congress. Military bases often provide large numbers of jobs to constituents.
Accordingly, Mayhew, Lindsay, and other political scientists have concluded
that legislators will fight to prevent base closures. Consistent with that
hypothesis, Congress prevented any bases from being closed in the decade prior
to 1987. Yet in that year, Congress enacted a base closing process that has since
eliminated hundreds of military facilities (and many thousands of constituent
jobs). How did Congress come to engage in such apparently suicidal behavior?
Have voters actually punished the legislators that suffered base closures in their
districts, as Mayhew and others would predict?
After examining the Congressional election returns from 1990 and 1992,
which followed the base closure rounds of 1989 and 1991, respectively, this
thesis found that base closure has no effect on the reelectability of members of
Congress. What accounts for this finding? Although bases often do provide
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important economic benefits for Congressional districts, and would therefore be
expected to be cf critical concern to voters, Congress designed a base closure
system that insulated legislators from blame if bases were closed in their own
districts. The success of this "blame-proof" system has important implications
for the future of the base-closing process and the larger question of how and
under what circumstances Congress delegates power to the President.
The base closure process was not the first instance in which Congress devised
a way of accomplishing an important national goal that conflicted with the
narrow, constituent-driven interests of many of its members. In the past, when
Congress has been unable to pass necessary legislation due to concerns over
constituent pressures, it has occasionally delegated powers to the President.
Congress did it after the great blunder of the Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930 and did
it in 1933 when they shifted the unpopular task of reducing veteran's benefits to
President Roosevelt. Congress delegated other powers to Presidents Truman,
Eisenhower, and Johnson. Congress found it difficult to close bases because of
the severe economic impact on the communities surrounding the bases.
However, believing that base closures had to take place, Members wanted to
provide for those closures without being held politically accountable.
The thesis reviews the literature on legislative behavior and the relationship
of members to their electorate and examines several instances where Congress
viii
has adopted a legislative approach similar to that of the Defense Savings Act and
the subsequent creation of the BRACC.
Also covered is an examination of the historical background of base closures,
the evolution of the base closure process, and an analysis of why and how
Congress came to believe that the Defense Savings Act would settle the problems
Congress associated with base closures. The thesis also discusses those critical
steps which resulted in the passing of the Defense Savings Act of 1988 and the
creation of BRACC in 1990.
A recapitulation of the data collection follows. It provides a summation of
our sample, all variables incorporated for consideration, and some of those
which we had considered using but later deleted. It is also a discussion of our
rationale behind the selection of each of the variables and the sources that we
used to build the database. Lastly, it includes our research notes delineating our
methods of estimation, any particulars, and recoding requirements.
Our examination and interpretation of the analyses is divided into four
subsections, which define and describe the four types of analysis used and
provide the evidence to support our thesis that the reelectability of members of
Congress is not hurt by base closures. On the contrary, base closures had no
effect on a member's reelectability. Lastly, our analysis dispels the myth that
anon-partisan commission was effecting partisan recommendations.
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I. INTRODUCTION
By 1987, a growing number of Congressmen had concluded that unnecessary
military facilities ought to be closed to help cut the Federal budget deficit.
However, what makes sense for the nation is not always attractive to the voters
in a particular Congressional district, or the Member who represents them in
Congress. Military bases often provide large numbers of jobs to constituents.
Accordingly, Mayhew, Lindsay, and other political scientists have concluded
that legislators will fight to prevent 5ase closures. Consistent with that
hypothesis, Congress prevented any bases from being closed in the decade prior
to 1987. Yet in that year, Congress enacted a base closing process that has since
eliminated hundreds of military facilities (and many thousands of constituent
jobs). How did Congress come to engage in such apparently suicidal behavior?
Have voters actually punished the legislators that suffered base closures in their
districts, as Mayhew and others would predict?
After examining the Congressional election returns from 1990 and 1992,
which followed the base closure rounds of 1989 and 1991, respectively, this
thesis found that base closure has no effect on the reelectability of members of
Congress. What accounts for this finding? Although bases often do provide
important economic benefits for Congressional districts, and would therefore be
1
expected to be of critical concern to voters, Congress designed a base closure
system that insulated legislators from blame if bases were closed in their own
districts. The success of this "blame-proof" system has important implications
for the future of the base-closing process and the larger question of how, and
under what circumstances, Congress delegates power to the President.
The base closure process was not the first instance in which Congress devised
a way of accomplishing an important national goal that conflicted with the
narrow, constituent-driven interests of many of its members. In the past, when
Congress has been unable to pass necessary legislation due to concerns over
constituent pressures, it has occasionally delegated powers to the President.
Congress did it after the great blunder of the Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930 and did
it in 1933 when they shifted the unpopular task of reducing veteran's benefits to
President Roosevelt. Congress delegated other powers to Presidents Truman,
Eisenhower, and Johnson. Congress found it difficult to close bases because of
the severe economic impact on the communities surrounding the bases.
However, believing that base closures had to take place, Members wanted to
provide for those closures without being held politically accountable.
Congressmen developed legislation to set up a commission that would
identify military bases to be closed to save money. The legislation was designed
to thwart efforts by members to block closure of individual bases and to insulate
2
individual members from constituent backlash. As first introduced, the
commission would have had 12 members chosen by the Secretary of Defense
and Congressional leaders. This commission would have had six months to
select a list of bases for closure, after which the Defense Secretary could accept
any or all of the selections. All environmental regulations and any other laws
that would restrict closures could be waived.
This process has worked. The reelectability of members of Congress has not
been hurt by base closures after the process was implemented in 1987. Because
no specific bases were discussed in the acts creating the commission, members of
Congress could feel free to support them. Since the national debt was making
headlines, getting rid of surplus in the military would be a popular idea in the
home districts. Besides, once a base had made the list, there would be little a
Congressman could do to change the base's destiny. However, there were
several highly visible measures a member could take to placate his constituents.
First, he could appeal to the commission not to select for closure the base(s) from
his district. This would be largely ineffective, but it would make the member of
Congress appear as if he is "doing something." Second, he could lobby fellow
members to reject the closure list (more of the same image-enhancing
powerlessness). Finally, he could try to restrict funding for the base closure,
which was, like lobbying, denounced by Congressional leadership as blatantly
3
parochial, therefore unsuccessful, but played well at home. In essence, the
reelectability of members of Congress who had bases selected for closure in
either the 1989 or 1991 rounds is not substantively different than the
reelectability for the rest of Congress.
Lindsay's argument that political reality demands that Congressmen obey the
parochial imperative or face "electoral suicide" needs to be revised. He asserts
that since nearly 60 percent of districts contain or are near military installations,
and that because the Defense Department has repeatedly closed or attempted to
close nt. _ous installations, the fear of those Congressmen, in whose districts
bases have yet to be selected for closure, would cause them to oppose any base
closure to avoid setting a dangerous precedent which may come back to haunt
them. However, it has not happened that way. To use Lindsay's own words,
"...reelection provides members of Congress with powerful incentives to address
the substance of public policy and vote their individual policy views."' This is
especially true if they can immunize themselves from constituent retribution.
This finding suggests some broader implications. First, the base closure
process is likely to proceed without legislative interference from Congress. As
long as constituent pressures continue to drive Congressmen to seek defense
James M. Lindsay, Congress and Nuclear Weapons, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1991), page 138.
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spending cuts, Congress can be expected to support further base closures, given
the lack of voter punishment for such closures. Moreover, if Congress can
manipulate the process so that individual members are rendered blame-proof,
then they may be able to repeat the process when faced with other potentially
dangerous issues such as reducing entitlement spending. The reduction of
entitlement spending may not lend itself to the convenience of an independent
commission. Unlike military bases, which are regional and affect o.-Iv a portion
of the population at any given time, entitlements cover a wider range of
constituents. Some of the major recipients of entitlements, such as those who
receive Social Security benefits, vote more often than the general public. Because
of this, these voters might become a more formidable obstacle and less likely to
overlook Congressional blame if their benefits were cut.
The second chapter reviews the literature on legislative behavior and the
relationship of members to their electorate and examines several instances where
Congress has adopted a legislative approach similar to that of the Defense
Savings Act and the subsequent creation of the BRACC.
The third chapter examines the historical background of base closures,
illustratL- - evolution of the base closure process, and analyzes why and how
Congress came to believe that the Defense Savings Act would settle the problems
Congress associated with base closures. The chapter also discusses those critical
5
steps which resulted in the passing of the Defense Savings Act of 1988 and the
creation of BRACC in 1990.
The fourth chapter recapitulates our data collection. It provides a
summation of our sample, all variables incorporated for consideration, and some
of those which we had considered using but later deleted. It is also a discussion
of our rationale behind the selection of each of the variables and the sources that
we used to build the database. Lastly, it includes our research notes delineating
our methods of estimation, any particulars, and recoding requirements.
The fifth chapter is divided into four subsections. Overall, it details our
examination and interpretation of the analyses, while the four subsections
individually define and describe the four types of analysis used. These
subsections provide the evidence to support our thesis that the reelectability of
members of Congress is not hurt by base closures. On the contrary, base
closures tended to have little to no effect on a member's reelectability. Lastly,
this chapter dispels the myth that a non-partisan commission was effecting
partisan recommendations.
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II. THE PAROCHIAL IMPERATIVE AND BLAME AVOIDANCE
This chapter reviews what the literature says about how legislators act with
regard to their relationship to their electorate, and examines several instances
when Congress has adopted a legislative procedure similar to the type of
political maneuver it accomplished with the establishment of the Defense
Savings Act and the subsequent creation of the Base Realignment and Closure
Commission (BRACC).
In Congress: The Electoral Connection David Mayhew states that
"congressmen are single-minded seekers of reelection," and that their "reelection
quest establishes an accountability relationship with an electorate."2 Members of
Congress have learned, over the years, that the successful congressmen were
those who tended to the local problems of their constituencies 3, "bring home the
bacon," as it were, or face defeat by those from home. In Congress and Nuclear
Weapons David Lindsay echoes this apparently common wisdom that parochial
David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1974), pages 5-6.
James L. Sundquist, The Decline and Resurgence of Congress, (Washington,
DC: The Brookings Institution, 1981), page 7.
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interests will cause legislators to resist any moves to close military bases because
base closures cause economic turmoil:
Political reality demands that members obey the parochial imperative,
regardless of the merits of DoDs case. Any other course would be electoral
suicide. Entire regions of the district or state could quickly throw their support
to a political opponent.'
Lindsay argues that the large economic impact that a base often has on an
individual district (as opposed to defense contracts, which tend to be
geographically diverse, thus have less impact on each affected district) causes a
legislator to fear electoral defeat if the base in his district is closed. Lindsay also
asserts that since nearly 60 percent of districts contain or are near military
installations, and that because the Defense Department has repeatedly closed or
attempted to close numerous installations, the fear of those members of
Congress, in whose districts bases have yet to be selected for closure, would
cause them to oppose any base closure to avoid setting a dangerous precedent
which may come back to haunt them. Among the other reasons Lindsay cites as
justification for opposing base closures are that closures are not equitably




Another argument Congress has used to oppose base closures is the desire to
ensure that the president does not use bases as political tools, i.e., for reward or
punishment. While it is not possible to know for certain whether bases have
been closed for political reasons, a number of Congressmen believe that bases
have been and will continue to be so. In 1985, Senator Dale Bumpers (D-AR)
told the Senate: "You know why the law makes it difficult for (the Defense
Department) to close a base.. .It is to make certain that Senators are not
disciplined and chastised because they happen to disagree with the Defense
Department on a crucial vote." Senator John Heinz (R-PA) said that:
it is easy to imagine how the closing of bases, if skillfully manipulated.. .could
be used either to influence votes or exact retribution for votes that did not turn
out to be the way the administration wanted them to be.. .not the kind of a
grant of power to a power-hungry Defense Department that this Senator wants
to have any part of.
Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) summarized Senate opinion: "the fear of the exercise
of untrammeled executive power is what led or what continues to fuel the
support for the protections against base closing.'5 Imagined reasons for
executive retribution are not limited to actions by Congress; two bases, Amarillo
Air Force Base, Texas, and Newport Naval Base, Rhode Island, were ostensibly
closed after their respective surrounding communities failed to support the
United States Congress, 100th Congress, 2nd Session, House Committee on
Armed Services, Base Closure (Washington, DC: United States Government
Printing Office, 1988), page 21.
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President in reelection bids.6 The idea of executive retribution may account for
the reason that most Congress members who had no bases in their districts
would support controls on closures.
A third reason why members oppose base closures is the severe economic
impact on the surrounding communities. Lindsay maintains:
Frequently several towns depend on the well being of the base. A decision to
close or realign a military installation can literally turn the surrounding
communities into ghost towns as base personnel leave, related businesses
collapse, and the tax base dries up.7
Speaking in opposition to the Defense Savings Act in 1988, Representative
"Sonny" Montgomery (D-MS) summed it up by saying, "I don't really need any
more people on welfare in my state... the military bases are a good economic
measure for my people."'
As Lindsay points out in Congress and Nuclear Weapons, not only do
Congressmen vote to protect their own parochial interests; rather they often set
Ibid., page 27. Amarillo, which was closed in 1968, was done so supposedly
as the result of failing to support President Johnson in the 1964 presidential
election. The rumor in Newport, which was severely cut back in 1973, was that
the electorate had failed to back President Nixon in 1972.
Lindsay, pages 137-8.
1988 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, page 444.
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agendas and vote on issues based on their own individual ideologies and their
conceptions of the national interest:
...congressional deference and parochialism play a subsidiary role in
Congress's deliberatons .... What best explains congressional decision making
are the personal policy preferences of individual members. Simply put, no
theory that ignores the policy beliefs of legislators will work well in
explaining congressional behavior. And recognizing the importance of
personal policy preferences does not require any heroic assumptions about
what motivates members of Congress. Legislators are not angels; for most
the overriding goal is to be reelected. But contrary to conventional wisdom,
reelection provides members of Congress with powerful incentives to
address the substance of public policy and vote their individual policy
views. This is the genius of the American political system.'
Even though Congress felt that it was politically dangerous to allow bases to
close, they also knew that it had to be done. As Representative Dave McCurdy
(D-OK) stated during a HASC Military Installations and Facilities Subcommittee
meeting:,
...we have to be fair in these things .... we are sometimes too afraid
because... the National Taxpayers Union.. .or the newspapers.. .are going to
say, "These congressmen are just concerned about the bases in their district."




United States Congress, 100th Congress, 2nd Session, House Committee on Armed
Services, Base Closure, (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing
Office, 1988), page 61.
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The policy made sense, they felt, because it had to be done if they were going to
be able to cut back on the nation's expenditures. As Representative Dick Armey
(R-TX) expressed,
...the Federal budget deficit is extremely serious, and the particular financial
squeeze facing our Armed Forces is even more profound. Saving money by
closing or realigning unnecessary military bases may be a difficult task, but
it is one whose time has come. The potential savings are enormous.-
Representative Armey's statement was echoed by Arthur Ravenel Jr., (R-SC), "It
seems to me given the financial fix our country is in, this is a legislation whose
time has come. ""2 However, the parochial imperative prevented them from
accomplishing the task. So, they resorted to delegating their powers away, an
act not so uncommon as it first appears. Congress has engaged in this type of
maneuver before.
The reasons for Congressional maneuvers of delegating away power fall into
two categories: "We cannot do the job," and "We do not want to be held
politically responsible." The first describes a situation whereby Congress has
been unable to pass necessary legislation without concerning itself with debts to
special interests and the parochial imperative or it simply does not have the tools




describes a situation in which Congress has backed off from political "hot
potatoes" because it feared retribution at the hands of its electorate.
When Congress has determined it "could not do the job" with regards to tariff
and spending, it has delegated these important powers to the President.
Likewise, when the legislators have found themselves too vulnerable to
pressures from special interests and the voting public, and have concluded that
the retention of certain powers involved too great a political cost, they have also
deferred to the Executive."3 The Sinuot-Hawley Act of 1930, which raised tariff
rates to record levels, was widely condemned as a monstrosity of legislative
tariff-making because the retaliatory tariffs of foreign nations caused a sharp
decline in United States foreign trade. Senator David I. Walsh said at the time
that if bartering at the ballot had not taken place, then "some other invisible
influence has brought about a shifting of votes and reversals of judgement that is
unparalleled in the history of legislation." Senator Robert M. La Follette (R-WI)
spoke of legislators in the hands of lobbyists, "Votes were changed
overnight...for the conferring of new privileges upon favored interests."
Congress learned its lesson: Being responsible also means risking blame. Every
award given out is also a risk, because it must sometimes be denied. If the
13
Louis Fisher, President and Congress: Power and Policy (New York: The
Free Press, 1972), page 66.
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Congress member cannot meet the demands, then he may be glad to give up a
significant portion of his power. This is just what Congress did; it delegated its
tariff-making powers to the President."1
When Congress finds itself in the position of having to do something which it
perceives must be done, but which is potentially hazardous, either to the
members of Congress themselves or to the greater interests of the United States,
it devises measures to immunize itself from harm. In 1933, for example, there
were thousands of individuals on the rolls of the Veteran's Bureau drawing
compensation to which they were not entitled. The Veteran's Committee could
not figure out a way to get these names off the list, so Congress shifted the
unpopular task to President Roosevelt, who subsequently received authority to
reduce veteran's benefits and federal salaries as well. When some legislators
complained that Roosevelt was becoming dictatorial, Senator Millard E. Tydings
responded, "Of course...Congress refused to do its duty."'5
Congress has also shown an unwillingness to be held politically accountable
for questions of national security and military preparedness. Presidents





by the Constitution when they announced a policy and sought legislative
approval at the same time. The Truman Doctrine, The Eisenhower Doctrine, and
Johnson's Tonkin Gulf Resolution, respectively, were announced by the same
dramatic method - a special message to Congress - which thus committed the
United States in the eyes of the world and imposed on Congressmen who did
not support the President's stand a heavier responsibility than most were willing
to assume." Congress showed similar acquiescence in 1933 for President
Roosevelt's "war" against the great depression and for President Johnson's "war"
on poverty in 1964.17
In 1967, in the Postal Revenue and Federal Salary Act, Congress established a
commission to recommend pay levels for its members, among other federal
officials. The commission was directed to report its recommendations to the
President, who could modify or accept the pay rate proposals and then send
them to Congress. The recommendations would become law unless Congress
enacted other pay rates or either house disapproved the proposals within 30
days. During debate, several legislators tried to discredit the plan to delegate
authority to the President to decide the pay rates for Congressmen, but most
Francis 0. Wilcox, Congress, The Executive. and Foreign Policy, (New York:
Harper & Row, 1971), pages 106-7.
Fisher, pages 74-77.
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members thought it a convenient way to render themselves blame-proof.
Representative Chet Holifield (D-CA) said a vote by Congress for a raise in
wages would bring on accusations of conflict in interest. Congress had again
devised measures to immunize itself from political accountability."S
The situation of base closures falls, interestingly, into both categories.
Congress was not able to close bases because of the severe economic impact on
the communities surrounding the bases. However, believing that base closures
had to take place, it did not also want to be held politically accountable for the
closures. The political maneuver Congress used to solve its dilemma (the
establishment of the Defense Savings Act and the subsequent creation of the
BRACC), closely resembles the political shell game known as the Postal Revenue
and Federal Salary Act of 1967. Just as in 1967, a commission was established
and was directed to report its recommendations to the President. Unlike the
1967 act, which he could modify, the President must accept or reject the
proposals and then send them to Congress. The recommendations would
become final unless Congress rejected them in toto. Again, most members of
Congress found it a convenient way to render themselves blame-proof.
In conclusion, the literature portrays the members of Congress as having an
accountability relationship with their electorate; successful congressmen tend to
Ibid., page 69.
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the local problems of their constituencies. Furthermore, these parochial interests
will cause legislators to resist any moves to close military bases because base
closures cause economic turmoil in the communities surrounding the bases.
Although Congress felt that it was politically dangerous to allow bases to close,
Congress also knew that bases had to be closed, if the nation was going to be
able to cut back on expenditures. Inasmuch as the parochial imperative
prevented Congress from accomplishing the task, it overcame this predicament
by resorting to the not so uncommon act of delegating away Congressional
powers. Congress had engaged in this type of maneuver before, and as before,
Congress got what it wanted done and distanced itself from liability.
17
III. HISTORY OF BASE CLOSURES
This chapter reviews the history of base closure processes, beginning with the
1960's and Congress' unsuccessful attempt to regulate closures in 1965. It then
examines Congress' second failed attempt to regulate closures in 1976 and its
subsequent success in the following year. Lastly, it describes the crucial steps
that led to the Defense Savings Act of 1988 and the creation of the Base
Realignment and Closure Commission.
Prior to the mid-1960's, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara set about
the "most extensive base realignment and closure in the history of the United
States.""9 He and his Pentagon "whiz kids" initiated an aggressive cost cutting
drive that would eventually effect hundreds of sites throughout the country.
Among these were 60 major installations the Defense Department intended to
completely shut down and eliminate from its inventory.20 The Secretary of
19
Defense Secretary's Commission on Base Realignment and Closure, Base
Realignments and Closures (Washington DC: United States Government Printing
Office, 1988), page 8.
20
United States Department of Defense, Base Closure and Realignment Report
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Defense was essentially free to close bases at will, with little or no consultation
with either the military departments or Congress, although "members of the
defense committees apparently used their positions to deter the Defense
Department from closing bases in their districts.'-2 1 In fact, over 125 Army and
Air Force bases were closed between 1952 and 197422-; 100 Army, Navy, and Air
Force bases were closed between 1961 and 1977.23 Congress had not anticipated
these broad actions or their considerable political effect and, with very few
exceptions, negatively viewed closure actions.2'
Congress rose up in arms. It had not been in session when the Defense
Department made its public announcement immediately after the 1964 elections
and, even though the massive restructuring would directly effect the lives (and
R. Douglas Arnold, Congress and the Bureaucracy: A Theory of Influence,
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), pages 95-128, cited by James M.
Lindsay, Congress and Nuclear Weapons, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1991), pages 133-4.
Arnold in Lindsay, page 134.
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Government Printing Office, 1986), page 1.
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probably votes) of thousands of constituents, McNamara virtually excluded the
legislature from his decision process. 5 Charges abounded from Congress that
the Johnson Administration was engaged in political deviltry and the two
branches of government readied to fight over which would eventually control
base closures.
The first attempt to establish formal Congressional control over base closure
procedures came in Congress' very next session in 1965. A provision of the fiscal
year (FY) 1966 Military Construction Authorization Bill gave either chamber 70
days to veto any proposal to close or "substantially" reduce any base. House
Armed Services Committee (HASC) Chairman L. Mendel Rivers (D-SC) claimed
that Congress' stand on the issue was a defense of its constitutional authority to
raise and support armies. He argued that since Congress provided money to
establish bases, it should have a role in closing them; to do less than that was
tantamount to being the President's "rubber stamp." Congressman Lucien D.
Nedzi (D-MI) expressed an opposing view that the bill was "directed at
subsidizing the economies of communities possessing unneeded military
facilities." The Senate deleted the provision, stating that it was an "unwise"
intervention into the Secretary of Defense's exclusive power to determine how to
Sandra A. Dougherty, Army Base Closures: A Status Report AUSA Background
Report #35, (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, 1991), page 1.
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provide the "effective, efficient, and economical administration of the armed
forces." The conference report replaced the requirement for notifying Congress,
changing the required notice to 120 days, but left out the Congressional veto of
closure plans?6
President Johnson vetoed the bill. In his message to Congress, he said that
the Attorney General's study of the bill found it to be a "fundamental
encroachment" of the separation of powers between the President and Congress,
which would "substantially inhibit" his ability to execute his responsibilities as
Commander-in-Chief. President Johnson objected to the idea that closures could
not occur when Congress was not in session and that he had restricted flexibility
in determining missions for bases. He also expressed objection to the constraint
on economic use of defense resources and further that he would "be concerned
about the cumulative erosion of the executive power by legislation."27
The revised FY 1966 Military Construction Authorization Bill replaced the
objectionable base closure provision with one that required 30 days notice (with
justification) to HASC and the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) before
closing any base employing more than 250 people. The HASC report on the bill
1965 Congressional Quarterly Almanac (Washington, DC: Congressional
Quarterly, Inc., 1965), pages 689-701.
Ibid., page 701.
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noted that Congress should concern itself with approval of base closures and
also refuted President Johnson's claim that Congress was not equipped to
examine such details of execution of the laws and other executive branch
functions. Five committee members with bases in their districts urged the House
to attempt to override the President's veto as a matter of principle, but no
individual or group in Congress attempted such an override.28 The bill became
law.
Congress placed an additional restriction on base closures in 1966. The 1965
bill required 30 days notice to HASC and SASC, whether or not Congress was in
session. The FY 1967 Military Construction Authorization Bill required at least
30 days of continuous session of Congress between fully-justified notification
and closure of any base with more than 250 personnel. President Johnson
criticized this provision when he signed the bill and promised to push for
revision if the restrictions hampered defense efforts.29
Although President Johnson was concerned about Congressional
encroachment on executive privilege, Congress seemed content that the
provisions of the fiscal 1967 Military Construction Authorization Bill did not
Ibid., pages 701-2.
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restrict the closing of bases. Between 1970 and 1983, during a period when the
military labor force declined by almost 25 percent 30 , the number of bases closed
represented less than ten percent of the Defense Department's inventory.3" Most
of these closures occurred as a result of the post-Vietnam draw down.:-
However, by 1976, a coalition of northeastern and midwestern Congressmen was
once again questioning the Defense Department's base closure methods,
specifically the criteria for selection. They alleged the selections for closure were
politically motivated and that their regions were suffering a disproportionate
share of the closures.
One example of the type of base being closed was Loring Air Force Base
(Strategic Air Command), a remote bomber base in northern Maine. By 1975,
Loring had become a liability for several reasons. Militarily, it was susceptible
to attack by submarine launched missiles; economically, it was expensive to
maintain because of the additional personnel needed to clear the yearly average
Hoffman, Mark S., ed., The World Almanac and Book of Facts 1993 (New
York: Pharos Books, 1993), pages 692-4.
Donald C. Rasher, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, Closing Military Bases to Generate
Cost Savings and Increase Military Efficiency, (Washington, DC: National War
College, 1986), page 4.
Ibid.
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of ten feet of snow from its runways. When the Air Force proposed reducing it
by 72 percent, Representative William Cohen (R-ME) spoke out against it.
Cohen was especially interested in the detrimental impact the closing of Loring
would have on the community which had developed around the base. He went
to House Majority Leader Thomas P. O'Neill (D-MA) in an attempt to stop this
claimed infringement.33
O'Neill advanced an amendment to the FY 1977 Weapons Procurement Bill
that would have forbidden reductions exceeding 50 percent of any base unless
Congress had been notified before 15 March 1973. This amendment would have
halted the Ford Administration's recently announced plans to close or reduce
operations at 160 installations. Supporters of the amendment claimed that the
previous base closures had been decided by individual discretion and that the
Defense Department had unsystematic methods to determine savings. They
claimed this amendment ensured that total economic impact would be
considered in the base closing decision process. Several members, including
noted proponents of reduced defense spending, spoke in favor of the
amendment; 96 members who had voted to delay funding for the B-1 bomber
voted for it. Military Installations Subcommittee Chairman Richard Ichord (D-
Edward F. Gordon, Captain, USN, Base Closure and Realignment. A Case
Study (Washington, DC: The Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1992), page
5.
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MO) opposed the amendment because it "would require the operation of our
defense forces not for the primary purpose of defending the United States, but
for the economic concerns of local, self-serving interests." The amendment was
defeated.'
Base closures were also a topic of heated debate during floor action on the FY
1977 Military Construction Bill. Now Speaker of the House O'Neill put forth a
similar amendment to the one on the Defense Procurement Bill. This
amendment would bar closure of a base with more than 500 civilian employees
or a reduction of more than 50 percent of the civilian work force of any
installation unless Congress received a one year advance notice and detailed
justification was provided to HASC and SASC. Supporters of the proposed
amendment claimed that the Pentagon estimates of savings failed to account for
training and construction at other bases and the increased spending of other
federal agencies after closure, e.g., unemployment insurance. They also claimed
that closures and realignments were often intended to appease senior
congressmen whose districts benefitted from the changes. Representative
Cohen, who co-sponsored the bill, rejected criticism that the amendment would
politicize the base closure process, claiming that "the defense posture of the
United States frequently plays a secondary role in the determination of what
,4
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base to emasculate or close." Military Installations Subcommittee Chairman
Ichord said that he could accept the amendment, but raised concerns about
conflict with the principle of separation of powers.
Opponents of the proposed amendment warned that the Defense Department
might choose to maintain unneeded bases rather than face the political obstacles
this provision would create. Representative Bill Frenzel (R-MN) said, "We might
as well call it an anti-taxpayer amendment, because in time we wanted to save
some money for the taxpayers of this country, we would not be able to do so if it
had an impact on one of our districts and the representative of that district did
not like it." Representative Elford A. Cederberg (R-MI), the ranking Republican
on the Appropriations Committee, noted the apparent hypocrisy of members
who "have been consistently condemning the Defense Department, voting
against appropriations for defense, voting against authorizations for defense,
and all of a sudden a small installation in their district is involved and they
complain." Attempts to reduce the reporting requirement to 60 days and then
six months failed, and both the amendment and the Military Construction Bill
were passed.35
SASC proposed legislation which would provide a permanent procedure
(rather than the House-proposed one-time measure) which would affect closure
Ibid., pages 313-14.
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or reduction of over 50 percent of any base with 250 or more civilians. The
,ropriate service secretary would notify Congress, providing rationale and an
estimate of the impact on affected employees and the local community.
Congress would then have nine months to take a closer look, after which time
the service secretary would inform HASC and SASC of his intent to proceed and
would detail "the estimated fiscal, economic, budgetary, environmental,
strategic, and operational consequences." Lastly, Congress would have an
additional 90 days to consider this information to "remedy the decision, if
warranted." The conference report was similar to the Senate proposal except
that it applied to bases with 500 or more civilian employees, and that it would
apply for only five years.36
President Ford vetoed the bill. In his message to Congress, he stated that
existing base closure and realignment procedures already complied with the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)37 and adequately took "into
account all other relevant considerations, and afford(ed) extensive opportunity
3n
Ibid., pages 314-16.
One of the important stipulations of this act imposed Environmental Impact
Statements on all undertakings that called for federal funding. These impact
statements required the activity making a change to address what effects the
proposed project would have on the community over a range of concerns from
environmental to economic.
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for public and Congressional involvement." The "arbitrary time limit and set of
requirements" would, he said, "generate a budgetary drain on the defense dollar
which should be used to strengthen our military capabilities" and would "result
in waste and inefficiency at the expense of meeting our essential military
requirements." He also objected to its "attempt to limit my powers over military
bases.""3
The House voted to override the veto 270-131, but the Senate failed 51-42.
HASC reported a revised bill which contained no base closure provision, stating
that the need to pass an authorization bill took precedence over its strong
concern for the base closure issue. SASC considered an amendment by Senator
Edmund S. Muskie (D-ME) and ten cosponsors which would have barred
closing any base with 500 or more civilian employees or reducing the civilian
work force at a base by more than 1000 persons or 50 percent before: (1)
Congress had been notified in writing, (2) justification had been submitted to
HASC and SASC, (3) NEPA terms had been met, (4) the Defense Department's
Office of Economic Adjustment had consulted with other federal agencies to
consider alternate uses of affected facilities, and (5) a 90 day delay had passed.
Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld objected to the amendment, claiming the
90 day delay would cost 35 to 40 million dollars, and that the provision for
1976 Congressional Ouarterly Almanac, page 21-A.
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economic readjustment planning was unnecessary and unwanted. The SASC
version only required a 60 day delay before a base realignment, with no
provision for economic readjustment planning. Both chambers passed the
Senate version and President Ford reluctantly signed it.39
It was not until the Carter Presidency that Congress would get control. In
1977, Congress again moved to restrict base closures. Representative Cohen put
forth an amendment to the fiscal 1978 Weapons Procurement Bill which would
make permanent the requirement for the Defense Department to inform
Congress and to provide detailed justification 60 days in advance of closure of
any base with at least 500 civilian employees or reduction of the civilian work
force by at least 1000 persons or 50 percent. This amendment was rejected.4" The
SASC placed a similar provision in the Military Construction Authorization Bill,
but it would only affect closure of bases with at least 1000 workers.4' The
conference report made permanent the provisions of the revised FY 1967
Military Construction Bill42 by adding Section 2687 to Title 10, United States
Ibid., pages 317-18.
43
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Code (10 USC 2687), which required that before anv installation with at least 500
civili. .- be closed or any installation have its civilian work force reduced by at
least 1000 persons or 50 percent, whichever was less, the following had to occur:
(1) The HASC and the SASC had to be informed in writing, (2) NEPA conditions
had to be met, (3) Detailed justifica' ion for the decision, including statements of
the estimated fiscal, local economic, budgetary, environmental, strategic, and
operational consequences of the proposed closure or realignment had to be
submitted to the HASC and the SASC, and (4) Before any irrevocable action to
effect or implement the decision took place, a delay period of 60 days had to
pass. President Carter signed the bill into law.4"
The NEPA and 10 USC 2687 effectively served to check any further base
closures or realignments due to the inability of the military departments to meet
all of the regulatory requirements while at the same time trying to opportunely
resolve the political consequences.44 The Defense Department could no longer
streamline its base structure. Congress had control.
Ibid.c page 345.
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Government Printing Office, 1978), pages 17-18.
Base Closure and Realignment Report pages 167-168.
30
In 1981, President Reagan's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control, popularly
known as the Grace Commission, submitted its formal report to the President.
Among other issues, the Commission reasserted that the Defense Department
could certainly realize significant savings through a comprehensive adjustment
in its military base structure. Foreseeing the potential for political impasse, the
commissioners recommended the creation of an independent, unconstrained by
politics, base realignment and closure commission to set upon the issue and
develop proposals."5 President Reagan accepted the report, but took no
immediate action to implement the recommendation. One of the early policy
initiatives that Reagan did undertake was the "National Debt Retirement Act of
1982," a proposed bill to sell surplus federal real property and to use the
proceeds to help retire the national debt.46 He also issued Executive Order
Defense Secretary's Commission on Base Realignment and Closure, Base
Realignments and Closures, (Washington, DC: 1988), page 9.
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12348, which established the Property Review Board, the purpose of which was
to identify and make easier the prompt sale of surplus federal properties.17
The Reagan Administration's massive defense buildup brought major
changes to U.S. military force structure, but virtually left unchanged basing,
resulting in underproductivity and waste. Some units were reformed with their
subordinate units dispersed over a vast area, bringing about command and
control problems. Others were stationed at bases which could no longer support
their training needs, such as the Army brigade with a Central Europe
contingency mission which was based and trained in the West Texas desert.4s
After the peak in military spending in the 1980's, both the executive and
legislative branches recognized the excesses in defense installations, and
although both Congress and the Defense Department gave much attention to
base closures in 1985, little of real substance took place. Senator Barry
Goldwater (R-AZ), upon taking over as Chairman of the SASC in January 1985,
stated that "one of the best ways to approach the seemingly higher cost of
United States Congress, 98th Congress, 1st Session, Oversight of GSA's Federal
Surplus Real Property Disposal Program, Senate Document No. 98-655,
(Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1984), page 4, cited
by Charles E. Cassidy page 3.
Hugh R. Leonard, Jr., Colonel, USA, Handling the Hot Potato: Evolution and
Analysis of the Base Closing Decision Process (Washington, DC: The Industrial
College of the Armed Forces, 1992), page 4.
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Defense would be to close some of the bases that are no longer needed.""* The
Committee started to look at this issue and, in April 1985, indicated a belief that
the Defense Department should "consider and propose for closure bases that put
an excessive drain on already limited resources. -4'
The Defense Department reaction to this recommendation was to examine
closely and consider base closures as a way to economize operations. However,
because of the substantial one-time costs involved in closing bases, estimated to
average $125 million per installation, the Defense Department decided in March
1985 to recommend no closure activities as part of the FY 1986 budget.5,
By 1985, the political realities of the budget deficit and the effects of the
O'Neill-Cohen amendments led several members to reconsider the base closure
process. Senator Phil Gramm (R-TX) put forth an amendment to the Defense
Authorization Bill which would allow the Defense Department to waive the
Press Release, Senator Barry Goldwater, Chairman Senate Committee on Armed
Services, "Military Base Closures," 5 March 1985, cited in Donald C. Rasher, page
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United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1986, Report 99-41 to accompany S. 1029,
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Joint Statement by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Senator Barry
Goldwater, "Base Closures," March 1985, in Donald C. Rasher page 6.
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requirements of 10 USC 2687 in any year that the federal budget was in deficit.
Floor and committee debate centered on the members' fear of politically
motivated base closures. As a result, the Gramm amendment was pulled and
the Defense Department continued to be rendered powerless in its efforts to
close bases.52
The fiscal decision to close bases did not occur during the Reagan Presidency.
Critics say that the weight of "pork" was not the only reason that bases were not
closed during the Reagan years. Some argue that the Reagan Administration
thought it politically foolish to seek base closures at a time when military
expenditures were expanding at record pace. 3 To maintain support for these
tremendous military costs, the administration thought it best to "leave the 'pork'
in Congress and let the sleeping dog of base closures continue to lie."5"
United States Congress, 100th Congress, 2nd Session, House Committee on
Armed Services, Base Closure, (Washington, DC: United States Government
Printing Office, 1988), pages 20-21.
Mike Mills, "Members Go on the Offensive to Defend Bases," Congressional
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It was into an almost desperate fiscal atmosphere in 1987 that Representative
Richard Armey (R-TX) introduced a new approach to base closures. The
estimates at the time were that nearly ten percent of the Defense Department's
312 major domestic bases were simply unneeded."5 Armey, a Republican
second-term member with a Ph.D. in economics, introduced an amendment to
the FY 1988 Defense Authorization Act which would have established a 12
member bipartisan commission to recommend a list of bases, any or all of which
the Secretary of Defense could close or realign "regardless of any other provision
of law.""6 The amendment was initially approved by 15 votes, but "the
Democratic leadership froze the clock and then switched enough votes to kill
it""7 by seven votes.
A brief history on Armey here might shed some light on how a relatively
junior Representative could put forth such an important piece of legislation. In
1984, Armey, an economics professor, decided, while watching C-SPAN on
television, that he could do as well or better than the Congressmen he observed.
Phil Kuntz, "House Panels Differ Over Base-Closing Bill," Congressional Ouarterly
Weekly, 11 June 1988, page 1619. A major base is defined as one with at least 300
employees.
1987 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, page 238.
"Defense Cuts That Won't Hurt Defense," New York Times 23 October 1987.
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He sought and got his party's nomination unopposed because no one thought
the Democratic incumbent could be unseated. Armey campaigned using a comic
book which articulated his free-market views. After his upset victory, came to
Washington with so little personal money that he at first slept in the House Gym
and later on his office couch. Armey is said to have "fine political instincts" and
is not afraid to rile constituents (he opposed the parental leave bill as "yuppie
welfare") or ranking politicians (Education Chairman William Ford called him "a
pain in the ass"). Armey's incisive ideas and an understanding of how to sell
them coupled with his political antennae and tenacious sniping ensured that the
military base closing bill became "his first major achievement. "58
Armey, who was buoyed by countless newspaper and magazine articles
supporting the idea59, continued his efforts by discussing the issue with other
House members and Defense Department officials and by reintroducing the
concept as a separate bill (H.R. 1583) on 12 March 1988. The bill had 110
cosponsors. After the storm of editorial support for Armey's concept,
Congressional leadership finally began to support the idea; the idea was backed
58
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by Representative Les Aspin (D-WI), HASC Chairman, Senator Sam Nunn (D-
GA), SASC Chairman, and Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci. In spite of the
110 cosponsors and the heavyweight support, he met with political interference.
Representative Jack Brooks (D-TX), Government Operations Committee
Chairman, claimed his committee had jurisdiction over the bill because Armey's
plan included the sale of federal land. Representative Walter B. Jones (D-NC),
Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee Chairman, made a similar claim since
the bill would waive the environmental impact study required for base closure.
The chief complaint to the bill was that Congress would have no control over the
commission's actions, notwithstanding Congressional appointment of ten of the
twelve commission members.6"
In the interim, 11ASC Chairman Aspin and Representative William L.
Dickinson (R-AL), Ranking Minority Member, were working with SASC
Chairman Nunn and Secretary of Defense Carlucci on a similar bill. Their plan
differed in that the Defense Secretary would select the commission, instead of
Congress selecting ten of twelve, as in Armey's original proposal. After much
consideration, Armey withdrew H.R. 1583 and, on 28 April, introduced H.R.
The commission would have consisted of three members appointed by the
Speaker of the House and three appointed by the Senate Majority Leader; two
members appointed by the House Minority Leader and two by the Senate
Minority Leader; and two members appointed by the Secretary of Defense.
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4481 with Aspin and Dickenson as cosponsors. Nunn put forth a companion
amendment to the SASC FY 1989 Defense Authorization Bill on 27 April."b
These two amendments would create a seven member commission selected
by the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with leaders of Congress. The
commission would have six months to determine which bases should be closed
and report these to the Defense Secretary. He would then have 15 days to accept
or reject the entire list. Supporters claimed that these amendments would
remove politics from the base closure and realignment process. Opponents
maintained that the amendments went too far; Congress would be removed
from the decision-making process. Senator Alan J. Dixon (D-IL), SASC Military
Construction Subcommittee Chairman, put forth an amendment which (1)
would allow Congress to veto the closure list after the Secretary of Defense had
approved it, (2) would expand the commission to 15 members,
(3) would require the Secretary of Defense to consult Congressional military
subcommittee chairmen and national associations of state and local officials,
(4) would require the commission membership to reflect a "reasonable"
geographic balance, and (5) would direct that senior committee staff not be
employed by the Department of Defense. The amendment was adopted on 10
May. Three days later, the Senate adopted an amendment by Senator Bumpers,
1988 Congressional Ouarterly Almanac page 440.
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which required the commission to consider the costs to the entire federal
government, and State and local governments, not only to the Defense
Department, in deciding which bases to close.b2
Four versions of H.R. 4481 (one each from the four interested committees:
Armed Services, Government Operations, Merchant Marine & Fisheries, and
Rules) reached the floor on 7 July. After five days of debate, Armey put forth a
substitute amendment of his own to replace all four versions since committee
alterations had "radically changed" the original bill. Armey's revision had some
notable differences from his original bill: It allowed Congress to vote to
disapprove the closure list, and would require adherence to environmental
regulations during the base closure process but not during consideration by the
committee. After one amendment requiring that not more than half of the
commission's staff be employed by the Defense Department, the Armey revision
passed the House by 37 votes.63
On 5 October the Senate-House conferees agreed to a compromise version of
the legislation. Their report easily passed both chambers a week later. Members




subordinate constituency interests in preserving local payrolls to a broader
national interest in trimming the budget deficit."'
On 29 December 1989, after eight months of deliberation, the commission
announced its recommendations. It listed 86 bases for closure, 13 of them major.
Five more were to be partially closed and 54 additional bases would gain or lose
personnel through realignment. The commission estimated annual savings of
nearly $700 million leading to a 20-year savings of $5.6 billion." Those members
who lost bases predictably complained about the selection process, claiming that
the bases in their districts had been unfairly picked. Their cries were, as
planned, in vain. House Joint Resolution 165, which would have disapproved
the commission results, was overwhelmingly defeated 381-41. The bill was
sponsored by Representative George E. Brown, Jr. (D-CA), whose district lost
both George and Norton Air Force Bases.'
Members who lost bases from their districts tried to stop the closure process
by restricting funding for the closures. Opponents of funding the closures were
led by Representatives Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) and Barbara Boxer (D-CA), who
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were fighting to save the Presidio of San Francisco, and were supported by
Representative Jack Murtha (D-PA), Chairman, Defense Appropriations
Subcommittee (HADS), whose district contained the Philadelphia Naval
Shipyard, a potential victim of any future base closure selections. The HADS
version of the FY 1991 Defense Authorization Bill would prevent spending any
money on closure until the General Accounting Office (GAO) confirmed that the
required savings would occur within six years. HASC members complained
that this move was in violation of the 1988 base closure law so the objectional
wording was cut. Pelosi and Boxer had planned to put forth a separate
amendment to block funds to close the Presidio of San Francisco; they gave up
the idea when the Murtha language was removed. The Senate Appropriations
Committee, led by Senator Dixon, whose constituents in the area surrounding
Chanute Air Force Base were backing him with an unrestrained advertising
campaign, attempted to add language similar to that which was removed by the
House. This endeavor also met with defeat. Lastly, the Senate Appropriations
Committee attempted to cut the authorization from $500 million to $300 million
and to handle the issue in the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee instead of
in the Military Construction Subcommittee, as the House had done. However,
41
the Senate yielded both points to the House in conference and the full amount
was appropriated"7
When Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney proposed on 29 January 1990 to
eliminate 35 additional domestic bases in FY 1991, the issue once again moved to
the front of many congressmen's plates. The Democrats immediately
complained that the selections were politically motivated; 29 of the 35 bases
were in the districts of Democratic members. Representative Pat Schroeder (D-
CO), Chairwoman, HASC Military Installations Subcommittee, said that "instead
of producing a comprehensive force structure plan, which included base
closures, Secretary Cheney has produced an unbalanced, partisan hit list."
Secretary Cheney insisted that he did not change the list provided to him by the
individual services.68
HASC Chairman Aspin recommended forming another commission to settle
the problem. Although Cheney was "certainly willing to consider" Aspin's
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HASC reported the FY 1991 Defense Authorization Bill with a ban on any
new closures. Cheney countered with a caution that he would urge President
Bush to veto the bill unless it were modified. The House passed the
authorization bill prohibiting closures until the Defense Department proposed a
non-partisan method for selecting bases for closure. Initially, SASC wanted to
remove barriers to base closures, but the announced list prompted Senator
Bumpers to put forth an amendment to bar domestic base closures and to require
the Secretary of Defense to report to Congress on the proposed organization and
size of U.S. forces through FY 1996. SASC Chairman Nunn objected; the
amendment would, he said, "send a signal to the American people that the
Congress has a lot of rhetoric in terms of cutting defense expenditures, but.. .we
are not willing (to close bases)." The amendment was defeated 54-43.7o
The conference report created a permanent eight member commission,
selected by the Secretary of Defense and confirmed by the Senate, which would
recommend bases for closure and realignment in 1991, 1993, and 1995. As in the
Defense Savings Act of 1988, both the Secretary of Defense and Congress would
have to accept or reject each list without modification. A Congressional vote to
reject the list would be subject to presidential veto, which would, in turn, require
a two-thirds majority to override and stop the base closing process. Although
Ibid., pages 694-5.
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the Bush Administration was opposed to Senate confirmation of commission
members, the President signed the bill on 5 November 1990.71
The reason Congress overcame its antipathy to base closures between 1975
and 1987 was concern for the national debt, which had more than tripled during
the Reagan Presidency. It had grown from $907.7 billion in 1980 to $2.8574
trillion in 19b9.7'2 This incredible growth in the national debt led Congress to
think that the public wanted action, i.e., decreases in spending which, in turn,
led to the most vulnerable target for cuts - defense spending. Big reductions in
defense spending could be achieved by closing bases. Representative Joe Barton,
(R-TX) summed it up on the House floor:
...there are over 4,000 military bases in this country. It is estimated that if we
pass the Armey substitute (amendment to H.R. 4481) we could save
somewhere between $2 and $5 billion per year. In an era of deficit reduction
and the need to get the biggest bang for the buck from our defense dollar, I
think this substitute is very worthy of support...73
But closing bases meant constituent job losses, and those, they felt, would
translate into negative votes. Congress' failure to obey the laws it passed to
Ibid., page 687.
World Almanac page 128.
United States Congress, 100th Congress, 2nd Session, Congressional Record
Vol. 134 No. 101 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 12
July 1988), page H5438.
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reduce the deficit contributed to the public perception that it was unable to make
tough decisions. The politics of "pork" which prevented the Defense Department
from closing military bases was an easy source for denigration of Congress.
Since Congress would not allow the closure of any individual base, it had to find
a way to take politics out of the process while allowing closures to occur.
The commission offered members a way out. As Representative Armey
explained to the HASC, "I understand the need by the Members and I think the
commission is a way to protect them, maintain their ability to be involved,
protect them from political reprisals ...... 7" Representative Jack Brooks, (D-TX)
called it "look ma, no hands" legislation.75 It obviously made sense to eliminate
anonymous excess bases, and the establishment of a non-partisan commission
had the dual benefits of taking politics out of the issue and shifting the blame for
the closures. Brooks called the idea of a commission "Rube Goldberg
gimmicks"76 that "put the base closure decisionmaking process on autopilot,
-4
United States Congress, 100th Congress, 2nd Session, House Committee on
Armed Services, Base Closure, (Washington, DC: United States Government
Printing Office, 1988), page 13.
United States Congress, 100th Congress, 2nd Session, Congressional Record
Vol. 134 No. 101 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 12
July 1988), page H5434.
Rube Goldberg (1883-1970) was an American cartoonist who is best known
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getting Congress off the hook by permitting it to avoid its constitutional duty."'
Representative Jim Kolbe (R-AZ) summed it up for those concerned with the
impact of base closures on reelection, "Through this all-or-nothing approach,
Members can be assured that no political retribution could be meted out to an
individual Member.7' Among those without bases, it made perfect sense to vote
for the measure, and they did.
The development of the Defense Savings Act and the commission established
in the FY Defense Authorization Act illustrate how Congressional members'
fears were calmed and political costs to them were lessened. As first introduced,
the commission would have had 12 members chosen by the Secretary of Defense
and Congressional leaders. This commission would have had six months to
select a list of bases for closure, after which the Defense Secretary could accept
any or all of the selections. All environmental regulations and any other laws
that would restrict closures could have been waived. Congressional opponents
for his "Crazy Inventions," in which elaborate hilarious mechanisms are concocted
to perform simple operations. The term a "Rube Goldberg," meaning an incredibly
complicated, impractical scheme or device, has become part of the American idiom.
77
United States Congress, 100th Congress, 2nd Session, Congressional Record
Vol. 134 No. 101 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 7
July 1988), page H5324.
Ibid., page H5325.
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to this feared that their lack of control gave the administration too much power,
one reason for the bill's defeat in 1987. Congress also did not want to make
opposition to base closures too easy, so it defeated a 1988 proposal to require
Congressional approval of the list. The solution midway between the extremes
was to force the Secretary of Defense to accept or reject the entire list without
change and Congress could only reject the list by majority vote. Congress
further refined the process in 1990. The Defense Secretary would select the
commission members, but they would be subject to Senate confirmation. Lastly,
any resolution by Congress to reject the list would be subject to presidential veto.
The effect was to achieve the objective of taking the politics out of the process,
the stated intent of base closure opponents, while allowing cost-saving closings
to occur.
Congressional members gained several advantages from this. Because no
specific bases were discussed in the acts creating the commission, members of
Congress could feel free to support them. Since the national debt was making
headlines, getting rid of surplus in the military would be a popular idea in the
home districts. Besides, once a base had made the list, there would be little a
Congress member could do to change the base's destiny. However, there were
several highly visible measures a member could take to placate his constituents.
First, he could appeal to the commission not to select for closure the base(s) from
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his district. This would be largely ineffective, but it would make the member of
Congress appear as if he is "doing something." Second, he could lobby fellow
members to reject the closure list (more of the same image-enhancing
powerlessness). Finally, he could try to restrict funding for the base closure,
which was, like lobbying, denounced by Congressional leadership as blatantly
parochial, therefore unsuccessful, but played well at home.
After 1977, litigation was another often used method of blocking closures.
Closures usually became bogged down in legal challenges to environmental
impact studies, since closure opponents were often able to convince a court that
some environmental factors required additional study. Congress overcame this
by setting a 60-day limit for filing lawsuits and by eliminating NEPA
requirements from the closure selection process. There were no environmental
impact studies to challenge because they were not required before a base could
be selected for closure.
Lastly, Congress was able to forgo the pain of closure. Although a base may
have been selected for closure, the actual closing was not going to take place for
several years. In the interim, planning for closure (allowing for another image-
enhancing opportunity) would soften the blow of the closure itself. In the years
between selection and closure, the public's mental joining of the Congress
member and blame would lessen, especially as a Congressman who pushed to
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save the base redirected the public's energies toward preparation of the base for
turnover and redevelopment of the surrounding community. Of course,
condemnation for the closure could be aimed at the non-elected Defense
Department.
The history of efforts by Congress with regard to military base closures has
been one of efforts to assume control and to safeguard parochial interests. Until
the late 1980's, Congress constructed many barriers to base closure. The majority
of members of Congress are influenced by their perceptions of constituent
opinion and its effects on their reelectability. As public opinion became more
vocal on spending control and the effectiveness of Congress in general, the
Defense Savings Act became acceptable. Members without bases in their
districts determined that the act was suitable for the perceived political end.
Those with bases could support the idea of closing anonymous surfeit bases.
The inability of the President or the Defense Department to alter the results
would limit the powers over military bases they had in the previous policy.
Since the same end would result while allowing bases to be closed, the act
passed. Finally, those members who lost bases in their districts were allowed
opportunities to make loud, if futile, noises to save their bases. Congress had
enacted blame-proof policymaking.
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IV. METHODOLOGY AND CODING
The objective of our statistical analysis was to measure the correlation
between a base closure and the reelectability of a member of Congress.
Essentially, we sought to determine whether constituents punish elected
Representatives or Senators as a result of a base closure in their particular district
or State, respectively.
We chose, as our case study population, four separate groups: (Groups 1 and
2) The members of the House of Representatives from the 101st and 102nd
Congresses, respectively, (Group 3) Senators from the 101st Congress whose
current terms ended in 1991, and (Group 4) Senators from the 102nd Congress
whose current terms ended in 1993. Our dependent variables are the results of
the election following each of the base closure rounds, i.e., the 1990 election
following the 1989 round and the 1992 election following the 1991 round, and
the margin of victory (or loss, if applicable) for those same elections.
Our dependent variable is, of course, whether or not a Congressman was
reelected. We developed a second dependent variable, margin of victory (or
loss) because the win-lose variable is nominal, therefore not open to regression
analysis. Our overall analytical effort was focused on determining which
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independent variables caused the greatest effect on winning an election and
winning by how much.
Our principal independent variable is base closure. Simply put, we wanted
to measure the effect of base closure on a Congressman's reelectability.
We included several money-related independent variables to see if money
counted more than base closing in affecting a Congressman's reelectability.
Additionally, we wanted to test the accepted notion that money buys votes and
more money buys more votes. To enable us to more thoroughly cover all the
contingencies, we broke the money variables down into how much each
candidate spent, how much he spent for each vote he received, and how much
more (or less) he spent than his opponent. A candidate's cost figures could
provide other possible reasons for why a member was or was not reelected.
One possibility for an incumbents defeat in the 1992 House election was
inclusion on the list of House Members who wrote bad checks. We included the
variable in the event we could not determine a strong correlation for another
independent variable. We expanded the analysis possibilities by adding another
similar independent variable, the number of bad checks each Member on the list
wrote. Because of the narrow scope of these variables (1992 House only) and the
strong evidence achieved using the other variables across all elections, we did
not include these two variables in our final analysis.
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We also included as independent variables how long a Member had been in
office and all of the results (money, margin, etc.) from the most recent election
prior to the announcement of base closure. Our aim here was to see if there was
a significant difference from election to election and, if so, could it be attributed
to base closures.
The following recapitulation is a summary of all of the variables we included
in our final analysis. Included in each summation is our rationale for selecting
each variable, the classification and coding of each variable, sources we used to
obtain data, and our research notes delineating any particulars or recoding
requirements, if any.
1. Name of Representative, the case study group. The first 435 names are
those of Representatives who were elected in 1988. Names 436 to 870 are those
of Representatives who were elected in 1990. Names 871 to 904 are those of
Senators whose terms ended in 1991. Names 905 to 939 are those of Senators
whose terms ended in 1993. Informative, String. Michael Barone and Grant
Ujifusa, The Almanac of American Politics. (Washington, DC: National Journal,
1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, and 1993).
Research Note: If a member died while in office or for some other reason
failed to complete his full term, his name remained in the respective group
according to the parameters outlined above.
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2. Party, a descriptor of each member. Nominal, Category (Democrat,
Republican, or Independent). The Almanac of American Politics, (1985, 1987,
1989, 1991, and 1993).
3. State, a descriptor of member. Nominal, Category (AK, AL, AR, etc.).
The Almanac of American Politics (1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, and 1993).
Research Note: We entered each State's postal abbreviation separately as a
category to be able to organize and recall the data for any analysis
contingency.
4. Sex, a descriptor of member. Nominal, Category (male or female), The
Almanac of American Politics, (1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, and 1993).
5. Year First Elected, a descriptor of member; denotes seniority and possible
influence of member. Continuous, Integer. The Almanac of American Politics,
(1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, and 1993).
Research Note: Year in this case means the year member was elected to his
current continuous term.
6. District, a descriptor of member. Continuous, Integer, The Almanac of
American Politics, (1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, and 1993).
Research Note: The members of the House of Representatives from the 101st
Congress (Numbers 1-435) reflect the redistricting following the 1980 Census.
Members of the House from the 102nd Congress (Numbers 436-870) reflect the
redistricting following the 1990 Census.
7. Final Closure, a descriptor of which members and districts were effected
by a base closure. Nominal, Category (Yes - On base closure list; or No - not on
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base closure list), Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, Report to
the President (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office,
1991), The Congressional Districts in the 1980s (Washington, DC: Congressional
Quarterly Inc., 1983), FAXes from United States Congress, House of
Representatives, Armed Services Committee, 2120 Rayburn Building,
Washington, DC.
Research Note: In the 1989 list, we determined a "major" base to be one with
more than 1000 employees as described in The Congressional Districts in the
1980s. In the 1991 list, ten RDT&E, Engineering and Fleet Support Activities
were on the list without location, thus we presumed them to be less than
major, so did not include them in the data. We determined a "major" base to
be one with more than 1000 employees as described in The Congressional
Districts in the 1980s. No population figures were given for Eaker AFB,
Arkansas, nor was it mentioned in The Congressional Districts in the 1980s so
we did not consider it to be a major base. Representative Foglietta (D-PA) had
two bases selected for closure in his district, however he could only be
credited with one "Yes."
8. Chamber, a descriptor of member. Nominal, Category (House of
Representatives, Senate), The Almanac of American Politics, (1985, 1987, 1989,
1991, and 1993).
9. Year Groups, a descriptor of member. Nominal, Category (House - 88-90,
Senate - 86-92, etc.), See Variable #1, The Almanac of American Politics, (1985,
1987, 1989, 1991, and 1993).
10. Election Results of 1984 (Election 84), to denote an increase or decrease
in comparison to the 1990 Senate elections. Rationale = fluctuations could be
54
caused by a base closure. Nominal, Category (Won, Lost, N/A), The Almanac of
American Politics 1986, (1985).
Research Note: A few members did not participate in regular elections, but
special elections because of deaths, resignations, or other non-elective causes
for leaving office.
11. Margin of Victory in 1984 (M Margin 84), to denote an increase or
decrease in comparison to the 1990 Senate elections. Rationale = fluctuations
could be caused by base closure. Continuous, Real, The Almanac of American
Politics 1986 (1985).
Research Note: We used the percentages given for the popular vote of the top
two candidates, subtracted the loser from the winner to obtain a raw result,
then rounded to the nearest whole percent (no decimal places). If there was no
opponent, the victor received a score of 100.
12. Election Results of 1986 (Election 86), to denote an increase or decrease
in comparison to the 1992 Senate elections. Rationale = fluctuations could be
caused by a base closure. Nominal, Category (Won, Lost, N/A), The Almanac of
American Politics 1988 (1987).
Research Note: See Election Results of 1984.
13. Margin of Victory in 1986 (% Margin 86), to denote an increase or
decrease in comparison to the 1992 Senate elections. Rationale = fluctuations
could be caused by base closure. Continuous, Real, The Almanac of American
Politics 1988 (Washington, DC: National Journal, 1987).
Research Note: See Margin of Victory 1984.
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14. Election Results of 1988 (Election 88), to denote an increase or decrease
in comparison to the 1990 House elections. Rationale = fluctuations could be
caused by a base closure. Nominal, Category (Won only), The Almanac of
American Politics 1990, (1989).
Research Note: Some members from this group (Numbers 1-435) did not
participate in the 1990 regular elections, but were replaced on that list through
special elections because of deaths, resignations, or other non-elective causes
for leaving office.
15. Margin of Victory in 1988 (% Margin 88), to denote an increase or
decrease in comparison to the 1990 House elections. Rationale = fluctuations
could be caused by base closure. Continuous, Real, The Almanac of American
Politics 1990 (1989).
Research Note: We used the percentages given for the popular vote of the top
two candidates, subtracted the loser from the winner to obtain a raw result,
then rounded to the nearest whole percent (no decimal places). If the
candidate won in the primary election, we obtained the margin of victory from
that. If there was no opponent, the victor received a margin of victory of 100.
16. Election Results of 1990 (Election 90), to denote an increase or decrease
in comparison to the 1984 Senate elections, the 1988 House elections for
Numbers 1-435, and the 1992 House elections for Numbers 436-870. Rationale =
fluctuations could be caused by a base closure. Nominal, Category (Won, Lost,
N/A), The Almanac of American Politics 1992 (1991).
Research Note: Some House members from this group (Numbers 1-435) did
not participate in the 1988 regular elections, but came to be on this list through
special elections because of deaths, resignations, or other non-elective causes
for the member on the 1988 list leaving office. Some House members from this
group (Numbers 436-870) did not participate in the 1992 regular elections, but
were replaced on that list through special elections because of deaths,
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resignations, or other non-elective causes for leaving office. Some Senate
members from this group (Numbers 870-904) did not participate in the 1984
regular elections, but came to be on this list through special elections because
of deaths, resignations, or other non-elective causes for the member on the
1984 list leaving office.
17. Margin of Victory or Loss in 1990 (% Margin 90), to denote an increase
or decrease in comparison to the 1984 Senate elections, the 1988 House elections
for Numbers 1-435, and the 1992 House elections for Numbers 436-870.
Rationale = fluctuations could be caused by base closure. Continuous, Real, The
Almanac of American Politics 1992, (1991).
Research Note: We used the percentages given for the popular vote of the top
two candidates, subtracted the loser from the winner to obtain a raw result,
then rounded to the nearest whole percent (no decimal places). If the
candidate won or lost in the primary election, we obtained the margin of
victory from that. If there was no opponent, the victor received a margin of
victory of 100.
18. Election Results of 1992 (Election 92), to denote an increase or decrease
in comparison to the 1986 Senate elections, and the 1990 House elections for
Numbers 436-870. Rationale = fluctuations could be caused by a base closure.
Nominal, Category (Won, Lost, N/A), The Almanac of American Politics 1994
(1993).
Research Note: Some House members from this group did not participate in
the 1990 regular elections, but came to be on this list through special elections
because of deaths, resignations, or other non-elective causes for the member on
the 1990 li~t leaving office. Some Senate members from this group did not
participate in the 1986 regular elections, but came to be on this list through
special elections because of deaths, resignations, or other non-elective causes
for the member on the 1986 list leaving office.
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19. Margin of Victory or Loss in 1992 (% Margin 92), to denote an increase
or decrease in comparison to the 1986 Senate elections and the 1990 House
elections for Numbers 436-870. Rationale = fluctuations could be caused by base
closure. Continuous, Real (Won, Lost, N/A), The Almanac of American Politics
1994, (1993).
Research Note: We used the percentages given for the popular vote of the top
two candidates, subtracted the loser from the winner to obtain a raw result,
then rounded to the nearest whole percent (no decimal places). If the
candidate won or lost in the primary election, we obtained the margin of
victory from that. If there was no opponent, the victor received a margin of
victory of 100.
20. Expenditures 1984, to denote all outgoing funds spent by the Senate
candidate committees from 1 January 1983 and ending 31 December 1984 (1983-
1984 election cycle). Additionally, to denote an increase oi decrease in
comparison to the 1990 Senate elections. Rationale = fluctuations could be a
determinant of electoral victory or loss. Continuous, Real, The Almanac of
American Politics 1986 (1985).
Research Note: All funds include loan repayments and contributions by the
committee to other candidates or committees. Refunds of contributions have
been subtracted from the total. Totals are rounded to the nearest thousand
dollars. In the event an individual is on our list due to non-elective causes, we
left his column blank.
21. Cost-per-Vote 1984 (Cost/Vote 84), to denote how much each Senate
candidate spent per vote he received in the 1984 election. Additionally, to
denote an increase or decrease in comparison to the 1990 Senate elections.
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Rationale = fluctuations could be a determinant of electoral victory or loss.
Continuous, Real, The Almanac of American Politics 1986, (1985).
Research Note: Cost per vote is calculated by dividing total expenditures by
the number of votes received by the named candidate. Totals are rounded to
the nearest penny. In the event an individual is on our list due to non-elective
causes, we left his column blank.
22. Spending Edge 1984, to denote the difference between the campaign
expenditures of the named candidate and his principle opponent. Additionally,
to denote an increase or decrease in comparison to the 1990 Senate elections.
Rationale = fluctuations could be a determinant of electoral victory or loss.
Continuous, Real, The Almanac of American Politics 1986, (1985).
Research Note: Where the named candidate was outspent by his opponent,
we assigned the Spending Edge as a negative number. The Federal Election
Commission (FEC) does not require candidates raising or spending less than
$5,000 to file, although some do anyway. If an opponent spent less than $5,000
and chose not to file, the FEC considers him as having spent nothing. In these
cases, the winning candidates spending edge will equal his expenditures
figure. Totals are rounded to the nearest thousand dollars. In the event an
individual is on our list due to non-elective causes, we left his column blank.
23. Expenditures 1986, to denote all outgoing funds spent by the Senate
candidate committees from 1 January 1985 and ending 31 December 1986 (1985-
1986 election cycle). Additionally, to denote an increase or decrease in
comparison to the 1992 Senate elections. Rationale = fluctuations could be a
determinant of electoral victory or loss. Continuous, Real, The Almanac of
American Politics 1988, (1987).
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Research Note: See Expenditures 1984.
24. Cost-per-Vote 1986 (Cost/Vote 86), to denote how much each Senate
candidate spent per vote he received in the 1986 election. Additionally, to
denote an increase or decrease in comparison to the 1992 Senate elections.
Rationale = fluctuations could be a determinant of electoral victory or loss.
Continuous, Real, The Alknanac of American Politics 1988, (1987).
Research Note: See Cost-per-Vote 1984.
25. Spending Edge 1986, to denote the difference between the campaign
expenditures of the named candidate and his principle opponent. Additionally,
to denote an increase or decrease in comparison to the 1992 Senate elections.
Rationale = fluctuations could be a determinant of electoral victory or loss.
Continuous, Real, The Almanac of American Politics 1988, (1987).
Research Note: See Spending Edge 1984.
26. Expenditures 1988, to denote all outgoing funds spent by the House
,andidate committees from 1 January 1987 and ending 31 December 1988 (1987-
1988 election cycle). Additionally, to denote an increase or decrease in
comparison to the 1990 House elections. Rationale = fluctuations could be a
determinant of electoral victory or loss. Continuous, Real, The Almanac of
American Politics 1990 (1989).
Research Note: All funds include loan repayments and contributions by the
committee to other candidates or committees. Refunds of contributions have
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been subtracted from the total. If a candidate won in the primary election and
did not have to run in the general election, his figure is taken from the primary
election. Totals are rounded to the nearest thousand dollars. In the event an
individual is on our list due to non-elective causes, we left his column blank.
27. Cost-per-Vote 1988 (Cost/Vot2 88), to denote how much each House
candidate spent per vote he received in the 1988 election. Additionally, to
denote an increase or decrease in comparison to the 1990 House elections.
Rationale = fluctuations could be a determinant of electoral victory or loss.
Continuous, Real, The Almanac of American Politics 1990, (1989).
Research Note: Cost per vote is calculated by dividing total expenditures by
the number of votes received by the named candidate. If a candidate won in
the primary election and did not have to run in the gene-al election, his cost-
per vote is figured from the primary election. Totals are rounded to the
nearest penny. In the event an individual is on our list due to non-elective
causes, we left his column blank.
28. Spending Edge 1988, to denote the difference between the campaign
expenditures of the named candidate and his principal opponent. Additionally,
to denote an increase or decrease in comparison to the 1990 House elections.
Rationale = fluctuations could be a determinant of electoral victory or loss.
Continuous, Real, The Almanac of American Politics 1990, (1989).
Research Note: Where the named candidate was outspent by his opponent,
we assigned the Spending Edge as a negative number. The Federal Election
Commission (FEC) does not require candidates raising or spending less than
$5,000 to file, although some do anyway. If an opponent spent less than $5,000
and chose not to file, the FEC considers him as having spent nothing. In these
cases, the winning candidates spending edge will equal his expenditures
figure. If a candidate won in the primary election and did not have to run in
the general election, his spending edge is taken from the primary election.
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Totals are rounded to the nearest thousand dollars. In the event an individual
is on our list due to non-elective causes, we left his column blank.
29. Expenditures 1990, to denote all outgoing funds spent by the House and
Senate candidate committees from 1 January 1989 and ending 31 December 1990
(1989-1990 election cycle). Additionally, to denote an increase or decrease in
comparison to the 1988 House elections for Numbers 1-435, the 1992 House
elections for Numbers 436-870, and the 1984 Senate elections. Rationale =
fluctuations could be a determinant of electoral victory or loss. Continuous,
Real, The Almanac of American Politics 1992, (1991).
Research Note: See Expenditures 1988.
30. Cost-per-Vote 1990 (Cost/Vote 90), to denote how much each House
candidate spent per vote he received in the 1990 election. Additionally, to
denote an increase or decrease in comparison to: the 1988 House elections for
Numbers 1-435, the 1992 House elections for Numbers 436-870, and the 1984
Senate elections. Rationale = fluctuations could be a determinant of electoral
victory or loss. Continuous, Real, The Almanac of American Politics 1992
(1991).
Research Note: See Cost-per-Vote 1988.
31. Spending Edge 1990, to denote the difference between the campaign
expenditures of the named candidate and his principal opponent. Additionally,
to denote an increase or decrease in comparison to: the 1988 House elections for
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Numbers 1-435, the 1992 House elections for Numbers 436-870, and the 1984
Senate elections. Rationale = fluctuations could be a determinant of electoral
victory or loss. Continuous, Real, The Almanac of American Politics 1992,
(1991).
Research Note: See Spending Edge 1988.
32. Expenditures 1992, to denote all outgoing funds spent by the House and
Senate candidate committees from 1 January 1991 and ending 31 December 1992
(1991-1992 election cycle). Additionally, to denote an increase or decrease in
comparison to the 1990 House elections and the 1986 Senate elections. Rationale
= fluctuations could be a determinant of electoral victory or loss. Continuous,
Real, The Almanac of American Politics 1994, (1993).
Research Note: See Expenditures 1988.
33. Cost-per-Vote 1992 (Cost/Vote 92), to denote how much each House
candidate spent per vote he received in the 1992 election. Additionally, to
denote an increase or decrease in comparison to the 1990 House elections and the
1986 Senate elections. Rationale = fluctuations could be a determinant of
electoral victory or loss. Continuous, Real, The Almanac of American Politics
1994., (1993).
Research Note: See Cost-per-Vote 1988.
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34. Spending Edge 1992, to denote the difference between the campaign
expenditures of the named candidate and his principal opponent. Additionally,
to denote an increase or decrease in comparison to the 1990 House elections and
the 1986 Senate elections. Rationale = fluctuations could be a determinant of
electoral victory or loss. Continuous, Real, The Almanac of American Politics
1994, (1993).
Research Note: See Spending Edge 1988.
35. Closure, a descriptor of which members and districts were effected by a
base closure. Continuous, Real (1 - on base closure list; or 0 - not on base closure
list), Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. Report to the
President (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1991),
The Congressional Districts in the 1980s. (Washington, DC: Congressional
Quarterly Inc., 1983).
Research Note: See Variable #7, Final Closure. We recoded this from
nominal to continuous to be able to include this variable in regression analysis.
36. Tenure 90, a descriptor of member; denotes seniority and possible
influence of member. Continuous, Real, The Almanac of American Politics 1992
(1991).
Research Note: See Variable #5, Year First Served. We recoded this from
integer (year of election) to real (number of years of continuous service) to be
able to better use for analysis as an independent variable.
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37. Tenure 92, a descriptor of member; denotes seniority and possible
influence of member. Continuous, Real, The Almanac of American Politics
1994,(1991).
Research Note: See Tenure 90.
38. Check Scandal, to denote whether named Representatives in the 102nd
Congress had at least one bounced check in the highly publicized scandal.
Rationale = Provides another possible reason for why a member was not
reelected. Nominal, Category (Yes or No), Congressional Ouarterly,
(Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 18 April 1992), pages 1006-
1007.
39. Number of Checks Bounced (# of Checks), To denote the number of
checks bounced by each House member in the 102nd Congress. Rationale = To
determine possible influence of the number of bounced checks on the member's
reelection and to annotate the extent of abusive behavior. Continuous, Integer,
Congressional Ouarterly (18 April 1992), pages 1006-1007.
During the course of our research, we deleted columns denoting base name,
base location (urban or rural), base size (small, medium, or large), base type
(USA, USAF, USMC, and USN), and year of base closure. Our rationale was
since these columns were not descriptive of the members of Congress, but of the
base itself, we could get little useful information germane to our thesis from
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them. Additionally, a separate database is required to use variables describing
the bases, which is beyond the scope of this study. We also took steps to further
refine our database and deleted variables denoting (1) whether the member of
Congress was a member of the HASC or SASC, (2) if he had any military
experience, (3) if he had written a letter to the Government Accounting Office in
an attempt to remove a base from a list, (4) his rating on the National Security
Index, and finally, (5) how he voted on the final base closure list. These
variables were to be used, in the event our hypothesis was disproved, to
determine if such actions had any bearing on a member's reelectability. As we
will see in the next chapter, these variables were not needed.
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V. EXPLANATION AND INTERPRETATION OF ANALYSES
This chapter explains the results we obtained from the four types of analysis
which we used to support our thesis that the reelectability of members of
Congress is not hurt by base closures. Of all the independent variables used,
base closures tended to have the least effect on an individual's reelectability. The
four types of analyses which we used to support are thesis include: Contingency
Tables, Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), Correlation and Covariance, and
Regression. For the sake of clarity, we divided this chapter into four
subchapters, one for each of the aforementioned analyses. Additionally, we
divided each subchapter into the four election categories examined in this thesis:
(1) 1990 House Election vs 1989 Base Closures, (2) 1992 House Election vs 1991
Base Closures, (3) 1990 Senate Election vs 1989 Base Closures, and (4) 1992
Senate Election vs 1991 Base Closures. However, when a finding in one election
category has an impact or is directly related to a finding in another election
category, then we discuss this occurrence in the subsequent election category.
A. CONTINGENCY TABLES
Contingency tables are used to determine whether or not a relationship exists
between two nominal variables. A variable is nominal when it classifies
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individual cases into distinct groups. For instance, in our dataset, entries such as
REP, DEM, IND, are nominal variables referring to which party a Congressman
belongs. Some included WON, LOST, and N/A to refer to what happened in a
given election year, while others were simply YES or NO to identify whether or
not an individual had a base close within his State or district. The contingency
tables analysis gives us four separate tables: a summary table, an observed
frequencies table, a percent of column totals table, and an expected values table.
A summary table shows the actual results or number of cases for each cell, as
opposed to an expected values table, which shows what the results were
expected to be if an independent variable did not have any relationship to a
dependent variable. The following is an explanation and interpretation of our
analyses.
1. 1990 House Election vs 1989 Base Closures
The first test we ran was to determine the relationship between the
dependent variable, ELECTION 90, and the independent variable, CLOSURE
LIST (See TABLE 1). In comparing the observed frequencies with the expected
values, we quickly note that they are almost exactly the same. Statistically,
between ten and 11 people who had a base selected for closure were expected to
win the election; ten, in fact, won. On the other hand, either nobody or one
person who had a base selected for closure was expected to lose. As expected,
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one Member, Representative Stanford E. Parris (R-VA), did lose.' By taking a
look at the percents of column totals, it appears as if having a base selected for
closure within one's district doubled one's chance of losing the election. 3.546%
of those who did not have a base selected for closure lost while 8.333% of those
who did have a base selected for closure lost. However, this apparent doubling
is the result of a single election and would be reversed had Parris not lost.
Lastly, two figures in the summary table, which further reinforce that base
closure really did not make a difference in this election, are the low contingency
coefficient and relatively high Chi Square P-Value (.042 and .6856). A
contingency coefficient has a range from 0 to 1 and is used to compare the
relationship between different pairs of variables. In this instance, the
relationship is weak. The Chi-Square P-Value indicates the probability of a
relationship being due to chance. The lower the value; the less likely that a
relationship is due to chance. Any value above .2000 suggests that the
Base closings seemed to be of little consequence in one of 1990's nastier House races.
The contest had an inauspicious start and degenerated as the campaign progressed.
Parris seemed to have the driver's seat but became bogged down by a relative lack
of attention to constituency service and metropolitan Washington, DC issues. He
also often took cheap shots at his Democratic opponent, Alexandria Mayor Jim
Moran, who had a few skeletons in his own political closet. Both had little good to
say about each other. Each spent close to a million dollars on the campaign which
had abortion as its major substantive issue. After a 52%-45% victory, Moran
thanked Parris for defeating himself. Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa, The
Almanac of American Politics 1992, (Washington, DC: National Journal, 1991),
pages 1284-86.
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association between the variables is likely due to chance. In this contingency
table, the relationship is most likely due to chance. In the end, the 1990 House
election clearly shows that having a base selected for closure did not negatively
impact a Congressman's reelectability.
2. 1992 House Election vs 1991 Base Closures
We ran the same analysis for this next category; however, we substituted the
dependent variable, ELECTION 92, for the one previously used to reflect the
new election year. The independent variable, CLOSURE LIST, remained the
same (See TABLE 2). While the expected values do not match as closely to the
observed frequencies as in the previous section, the ni -nbers are not too far off.
16 people who had a base close were expected to win the election; 14 people
actually won. In terms of losing, between two and three people were expected
to lose; however, four lost. The percent of column totals state that 9.685% of
those who did not have a base selected for closure lost, compared with the
18.182% of those who did have a base selected for closure lost. Again, it appears
as if the chance of losing doubled if a base were selected for closure within one's
district, but again, it amounts to a difference of one election. At most, one more
person lost than was expected, but was it due to having a base selected for
closure within his district? In any case, the relationship is weak and probably
due to chance (contingency coefficient, .067; Chi Square P-Value, .3729).
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Therefore, the effect would be so weak that it would not fundamentally alter
reelection rates. Because of this, there is no relationship between the dependent
variable, ELECTION 92, and the independent variable, CLOSURE LIST.
3. 1990 Senate Election vs 1989 Base Closures
We completed a similar type analysis for the two Senate elections. In the
first year group, the dependent variable, ELECTION 90, was crossed with the
independent variable, CLOSURE LIST (See TABLE 3). As in the other two cases,
the observed frequencies portion is almost a carbon copy of what was expected.
Four Senators having a base selected for closure in their State were expected to
win the election. Not surprisingly, four of them did win. Additionally between
zero and one Senator who had a base selected for closure in his State was
expected to lose. None lost. As a result, the percentages show that 3.448% of
those Senators not having a base selected for closure lost while those who had a
base selected for closure never lost. It is important to keep in mind that we are
looking at a much smaller sample, 34 individuals, in the Senate as compared to
435 people from the House. Of the 34 Senators used in this analysis, 31 sought
reelection in 1990. After the election, one Senator lost. It just so happened that
he did not have a base from his State selected for closure. Furthermore, the
relationship is weak (contingency coefficient, .173) and it is based on chance (Chi
Square P-Value, .5923). As with the others, the independent variable, BASE
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CLOSURE, did not empirically have an effect on the dependent variable,
ELECTION 90.
4. 1992 Senate Election vs 1991 Base Closures
The last contingency table that we used to support our thesis pertained to the
dependent variable, ELECTION 92. and the independent variable, CLOSURE
LIST (See TABLE 4). As we saw in the three previous sections, the expected
values and the observed frequencies are very similar. We expected to see seven
people who had a base selected for closure win. Also, we expected one to two
people who had a base selected for closure to lose. After the election, seven
people having a base selected for closure won, while one person who had a base
selected for closure lost. Interestingly, the percents of column totals for this
election suggest the exact opposite of what occurred in the House election. In
this instance, not having a base selected for closure in one's State appears to
double one's chances of losing the election. 16.667% of those who did not have a
base selected for closure lost; only 9.091% of those who did have a base selected
for closure lost. As before, this difference comes out to being just one individual
election. Furthermore, what is the actual effect of base closure on whether or not
one wins or loses? The relationship between the two variables is weak and
likely due to chance (contingency coefficient, .191; Chi Square P-Value, .5168). In
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conclusion, as with both House elections and the previous Senate election, the
above results demonstrate that base closure had no effect on one's reelectability.
While the previous four sections support our thesis, we elected to include
another contingency table because it pertains to the entire base closure
proceedings. Before the first two rounds of the base closure process were
complete, many Democrats accused the Republican Administration of unfairly
selecting bases which were located primarily in areas where Democrats were in
office. In fact, Representative Schroeder (D-CO) openly accused Secretary of
Defense Cheney of usi,:.g a bipartisan commission, BRACC, to accept partisan
base closure recommendations. However, the opposite is what actually occurred
(See TABLES 5-8). In all four categories, the dependent variable, CLOSURE
LIST, was compared with the independent variable, PARTY. In the 1990 House
election, between four and five Republican Congressmen were expected to have
a base selected for closure; seven or eight Democrats were to experience the
same. However, seven Republicans had a base selected for ciisure, compared to
only five for the Democrats. The percent of column totals (4.0 for Republicans,
1.923 for Democrats) suggest that being Republican more than doubled one's
chance of having a base from one's district selected for closure. While the
relationship is weak (contingency coefficient, .062), the Chi Square P-Value is
fairly low (.1947). Therefore, the two variables did have a weak relationship
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which may not necessarily have been due to chance. In the 1992 House election,
the expected values and the observed frequencies are more alike. Eight
Republicans were expected to have a base selected for closure; eight did. 13 to
14 Democrats were expected to have a base selected for closure; 14 did. The
percents evened out as well. 4.819% of the Republicans had a base selected for
closure; 5.224% of the Democrats did. However, the relationship is very weak
and absolutely due to chance (contingency coefficient, .014, Chi Square P-Value,
.9568). With respect to the 1990 Senate election, both the Republicans and the
Democrats were expected to have between two and three people each to have a
base selected for closure within each one's respective State. In reality, three
Republicans ended up having a base selected for closure, whereas, only two
Democrats experienced the same. As a result, the percents of column totals is
slightly higher for the Republicans than it is for the Democrats, 17.647% to
11.765%. Again, the low contingency coefficient (.083) and the high Chi Square
P-Value (.6282) make the relationship weak and most likely due to chance.
Lastly, in the 1992 Senate election, four or five Republicans were expected to
have a base selected for closure; five did. Six or seven Democrats were expected
to have the same; six did. Again, the Republicans have a slightly higher percent
total, 33.333%, as compared to the Democrats percent total, 30.000%. However,
the relationship is weak (contingency coefficient, .036) and it is due to chance
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(Chi Square P-Value, .8335). Regardless of what caused it, it is clear that the
Democrats were not treated unfairly. Overall, the Democrats did have a higher
number of individuals experiencing a base closure; 27 of them had a base
selected for closure compared to only 23 for the Republicans. However, the
expected values tell quite a different story. Statistically, the Republicans were
expected to have no more than 21 people experience a base closure; the
Democrats were expected to have as many as 30 people in their party have a
base selected for closure. Without a doubt, Representative Schroeder and some
of her colleagues are incorrect in their assumption that Secretary Cheney was
partial in selecting bases for closure and in their belief that the Democrats were
treated inequitably.
B. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE (ANOVA)
ANOVA examines the relationship between two variables to see if different
groups have a different means score. While a contingency tables analyzes two
nominal variables, ANOVA observes the relationship between a nominal
independent variable and a continuous dependent variable. Continuous
variables are those variables which ca: be expressed numerically. In our
dataset, some continuous variables include the year first served and tenure of a
Congressman. Other examples include the percent margin of victory for
members of Congress during a given election year, while still others refer to the
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dollar values of total expenditures, cost per vote, and spending edge used by
Congressmen in their quest for reelection. As before, we will present our results
for this type of analysis separately for each election category.
1. 1990 House Election vs 1989 Base Closures
The first ANOVA analysis we conducted was to determine what effect our
independent variable, BASE CLOSURE, had on our dependent variable, W%
MARGIN 90 (See TABLE 9). The mean margin of victory for those
Representatives who had a base selected for closure was 37.273%; for those not
having a base selected for closure, it was slightly higher at 41.106%. However, it
is again necessary to examine the P-Value to determine the probability that these
differences are due to chance. In this instance, the differences in percent margin
were due to chance (P-Value, .6936). When using ANOVA tables, one starts
with the assumption that the independent variable will have no effect. With this
assumption and a high probability that the differences are due to chance, it is a
reasonable argument to state that being on the closure list did not affect the
margin of victory for any member of Congress in this election. Additionally,
when we ran the same analysis and split it by those who won and those who lost
the 1990 election, the results changed slightly (See TABLE 10). Those who won
the election and had a base selected for closure won by an average margin of
victory of 41.7%. Those who won the election and did not have a base selected
76
for closure won by an average margin of victory of 4 3 .0 6 2 %. The difference
between these results and the previous ANOVA table shows that the variation
went from roughly 4% to about 2 %. On the other hand, those representatives
who were defeated lost by -7% or -7.267%, regardless of whether or not they had
a base from their district selected for closure. If an individual lost, the fact he
had a base selected for closure did not appear to effect his margin one way or
another. However, these differences are still due to chance (P-Values, .8904 and
.9749). The next set of analyses that we performed pertained to our dependent
variable, ELECTION 90. We wanted to see what effect the 1990 House election
had on an individual's total expenditures, his cost per vote, and his spending
edge over his competition (See TABLE 11). All three variables had a direct effect
on the outcome of the 1990 election and this effect was not at all due to chance
(P-Values, less than .0001, less than .0001, and .0916, respectively). Those who
won the election spent an average of $392,000 in total expenditures, spent $4.38
per vote, and outspent their competition by an average of $319,000. Conversely,
those who lost actually had a higher total expenditure of $655,333. Their cost per
vote averaged $8.44, but they were only able to outspend their competition by
$220,867. In essence, they had to spend more because their competition was
spending more. As a result, their expenditures and cost per vote were higher,
while their spending edge was not as high as those individuals who won.
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Therefore, what one spends on an election has a direct effect on how well one
will do in the same election. Similarly, we analyzed what effect tenure and the
outcome of the election had on one another (See TABLE 12). Those who won
had an average tenure of 11 years in office, while those who lost served just nine
years. However, this effect is quite possibly due to chance (P-Value, .3311).
2. 1992 House Election vs 1991 Base Closures
Using the same independent variable, BASE CLOSURE, we crossed it with
our dependent variable, % MARGIN 92 (See TABLE 13). The average margin of
victory for those Representatives having a base from their district selected for
closure was 26.5%. On the other hand, those who did not have a base selected
for closure enjoyed a slightly higher average margin of victory of 28.403%.
However, these differences are likely due to chance (P-Value, .7554). In turn, it
supports the hypothesis that we assume it has no effect. Interestingly, after the
first round of base closures, there was a 4% difference in the average margin of
victory between those having bases selected for closure and those not having
bases selected for closure. After the second round, this difference was cut in half
to 2%. Therefore, if there was anything to the effect that base closure had on
election margins of victory, then it seemed to have lessened dramatically after
the more recent and more noticeable round of base closures. When we used the
same variables and split the results by those who won and those who lost the
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1992 election, we discovered something startling. The mean margin of victory
for those who had a base selected for closure and who won the election was
36.929% (See TABLE 14). The same figure for those who did not have a base
selected for closure and who won the election was somewhat less at 33.381'%. Of
those who won, base closure appears to have had a positive effect. Yet, there is a
strong likelihood that this difference is due to chance (P-Value, .5560). While
those who lost were defeated by roughly the same amount, -10.0% or -10.1759%.
These differences; however, are entirely due to chance (P-Value, .9694).
Comparing the same elections costs to our dependent variable, ELECTION
92 (See TABLE 15), we find that the effect which EXPENDITURES 92 and
COST/VOTE 92 has on our dependent variable is not due to chance (P-Values,
less than .0001). However, the same is not true for the effect which SPENDING
EDGE 92 has on our dependent variable (P-Value, .4376). The average total
expenditures for the winners was $563,380; for the losers, it was $886,391. The
winners' cost per vote averaged $4.20, while the losers' cost per vote averaged
$8.07. Lastly, the winners had an average spending edge of $424,901, but the
loser-s only averaged $368,870. As the previous House election showed, the
losers had to spend more because their competition was spending more.
Because they lost and had fewer votes, their costs per vote were higher. This is
consistent with what one would expect to find in a highly contested race;
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however, it is difficult to determine which factor drove the other. Were the
dollar figures found to be high after the election results were in, or was it the fact
that it had been previously determined to be a tight race which drove the
expenditures up? Regardless, there is a direct effect between what one spends
on an election and the election's outcome. Because the independent variable,
TENURE 92, did not vary greatly whether or not one won or lost (See TABLE
16), it matters little that its effect is not due to chance (P-Value, less than .001).
Nevertheless, the winners averaged a little over 11 years; the losers averaged a
little over 12. Thus, tenure was not a significant factor in this election.
3. 1990 Senate Election vs 1989 Base Closures
As with the House elections, the first ANOVA test we ran in the Senate was
to determine what effect our independent variable, BASE CLOSURE, had on our
dependent variable, % MARGIN 90. The average margin of victory for those
Senators with a base from their State selected for closure was 28.0% (See TABLE
17). For those not having one selected it was 35.556%, a difference of seven
percent. However, this is likely due to chance (P-Value, .6532). When we ran
the same variables and split them by winners and losers (using the variable,
ELECTION 90), we found that the results were essentially the same (See TABLE
18). In this case, however, the effect is less likely due to chance than before, but
still likely due to chance (P-Value, .5904). On the other hand, the ANOVA and
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means tables for those who lost the election, whether or not they had a base
selected for closure, was not completed because there were too few observations
to compute. It is important to remember that only one Senator lost in his bid for
reelection in 1990, and he did not have a base from his State get selected for
closure.
With respect to the dollar values spent during the election and their effect on
the election as a whole, we ran the same ANOVA analysis for the Senate as for
the House. Unlike the House where we found extremely low P-Values
nullifying the probability of chance, the opposite it true for the 1990 Senate
election (See TABLE 19). On the whole, whatever effect the amounts for the
variables, EXPENDITURES 90, COST/VOTE 90, and SPENDING EDGE 90, have
on the likelihood of being reelected, it is surely due to chance (P-Values, .6109,
.9254, .4452, respectively). The Senators who won spent an average of $4,072,633
on their elections while those who lost spent substantially more - $6,221,000. The
costs per vote were very similar. The victors averaged $7.71; the losers averaged
$7.20. With respect to spending edge, the winners surprisingly had less of an
average spending edge than did the losers by a difference of $2,508,333 to
$4,880,000. As previously mentioned, these amounts suggest highly contested
races in which it is difficult to ascertain exactly which had a bigger impact on the
other. In either case, at least for this Senate election, any effect is highly due to
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chance. In terms of tenure, the 1990 Senate election is much like the 1992 House
election in that it is based on chance (See TABLE 20, P-Value, .9720). The
average tenure for those who won was just over 13 years; for those who lost it
was 12 years. Therefore, tenure did not have a strong effect on the likelihood of
someone being reelected.
4. 1992 Senate Election vs 1991 Base Closures
The final series of ANOVA tests which we ran pertained to the same
independent variables and their effect on both dependent variables, % MARGIN
92 and ELECTION 92. Those Senators who had a base from their State selected
for closure averaged a 16.125% margin of victory (See TABLE 21). Those who
did not experience a base selected for closure from their respective States
enjoyed a scarcely higher 17.190% margin of victory. As with the three previous
analyses between base closure and margin of victory, this one is also very likely
due to chance (P-Value, .8816). Unlike the former Senate election, which
produced similar results after splitting by another nominal variable, this time
different results were obtained (See TABLE 22). First, Senators who had a base
selected for closure and who won the election had an average margin of victory
of 20.714% compared to an average margin of victory of 22.176% for those
Senators who did not have a base selected for closure and who won the election.
However, this is due to chance (P-Value, .8208). On the other hand, those who
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lost and who had a base in their State selected for closure lost by -16.0%. This
figure is compared to -4.0% for those Senators who lost and who did not have a
base close. This finding is not due to chance (P-Value, .0157). However, a closer
look at the table shows that a single individual is accounting for the -16%.
Because only one Senator is involved here, other factors may have come into
play causing him to not only lose, but to lose by such a margin.
Moving to the dollars values and their impact on the election, we find that
the probability of chance varies greatly between the three independent variables
(See TABLE 23). Of the three, only the effect that Spending Edge 92 has on
ELECTION 92 is not due to chance (P-Value, .0142). The other two are due to
chance (P-Values, .5447 and .3583). Those who won in this election spent an
average of $4,097,542, while those who lost put out nearly 20% more at
$4,914,500. Ironically, in the House the cost per vote differential between those
who won and those who lost was about double: the losers spent twice per vote
what the winners spent. However, in the first Senate category both the winners
and losers spent in the $7.00 range. In this second Senate category the winners
almost doubled the losers in what was spent per vote. The winners averaged
$7.05/vote; the losers, only $4.12/vote. Completely contrary to what we saw in
the 1990 Senate election, where the spending edge of the losers was greater than
the spending edge of the winners, the opposite is true in this Senate election.
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The winners outspent their opponents by an average of $2,798,292. The losers
were not so fortunate; they only outspent their competition by an average of
$850,500, which for a Senate seat, does not amount to much. This difference,
with no likelihood of it being due to chance, clearly shows that spending edge
directly effected the outcome of the election. Lastly, we examined the effect
tenure had on the election (See TABLE 24). The average numbers of years in
office for the winners was almost 13 years. The losers averaged only seven
years, a difference of about six years. While it appears as if tenure did have an
effect, it is likely due to chance (P-Value, .3201). Nonetheless, it suggests that
there may be some credence to the relationship between the two variables,
TENURE 92 and ELECTION 92, and their effect on one another. However, a
regression analysis will determine more later.
C. CORRELATION AND COVARIANCE
The last analysis and perhaps the most significant that we conducted with
our dataset, dealt with regression. However, before accomplishing this task, we
needed to conduct a correlation test. The correlation values tell us the degree of
linear relationship between two or more variables. While variables such as %Y
MARGIN 90 and TENURE 90 do not have a linear relationship, others such as
EXPENDITURES 90, COST/VOTE 90, and SPENDING EDGE 90 do. Therefore,
we tested for multi-colinearity to make sure that multiple variables were not too
84
strongly related. A correlation test assesses the extent of this relationship. If the
relationship is not too strong, then the variables can be used together in a
regression. However, if the relationship between two or more independent
variables is too strong, i.e., is multi-collinear, then the variables hould not be
used together in a regression. Multi-collinearity makes the results sensitive to
sample or measurement error and produces an analysis with unstable coefficient
estimates. In turn, the results can not only be difficult to interpret, but they can
also be completely useless. After completing the test, it is necessarv to examine
the correlation coefficient, which has an absolute range from 0 to 1. If the
multiple variables assessed have a correlation coefficient of .75 or higher, they
should not be used. In the tests we ran on the variables pertaining to money
spent on elections, we used only the two variables which had the lowest value,
i.e., smallest degree, of linear relationship.
1. 1990 House Election vs 1989 Base Closures
We completed two separate correlation matrices for the six independent
variables: EXPENDITURES 88, COST/VOTE 88, SPENDING EDGE 88,
EXPENDITURES 90, COST/VOTE 90, and SPENDING EDGE 90 (See TABLE
25). As a result, we discarded both EXPENDITURES 88 and EXPENDITURES 90
since the values for the other two variables were lower. COST/VOTE 88 and
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SPENDING EDGE 88 had a correlation coefficient of .489; COST/VOTE 90 and
SPENDING EDGE 90 had a value of .683
2. 1992 House Election vs 1991 Base Closures
In the 1992 House election, we conducted the same type of correlation test;
however, instead of the dollar amounts spent for the 1988 election year, we used
those figures for the 1992 election year (See TABLE 26). Our six independent
variables were: EXPENDITURES 90, COST/VOTE 90, SPENDING EDGE 90,
EXPENDITURES 92, COST/VOTE 92, and SPENDING EDGE 92. Again, we
dropped both expenditures figures. COST/VOTE 90 and SPENDING EDGE 90
had a correlation coefficient of .599 while COST/VOTE 92 and SPENDING
EDGE 92 had one of .670.
3. 1990 Senate Election vs 1989 Base Closures
Moving to the Senate and the next category, we find a slight deviation (See
TABLE 27). Whereas we previously discarded the expenditures figure, this was
not the case for the 1984 Senate election. In this matrix, COST/VOTE 84 and
SPENDING EDGE 84 had a correlation coefficient of .773, past the acceptable
limit of .75. Additionally, the correlation coefficient for EXPENDITURES ' 1 and
COST/VOTE 84 was lower at .628. However, this deviation did not hold true
for the 1992 Senate election. As in the past, we discarded the variable,
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EXPENDITURES 90, because the lowest correlation coefficient, .230, belonged to
the COST/VOTE 90 and SPENDING EDGE 90.
4. 1992 Senate Election vs 1991 Base Closures
In the last correlation matrix (See TABLE 28), we again encountered the
previously mentioned deviation; however, in this instance, we found a negative
value. The correlation coefficient for the two variables, EXPENDITURES 86 and
COST/VOTE 86, was -.003 while the same figure was .039 for COST/VOTE 86
and SPENDING EDGE 86. As before, we found this deviation occurred only in
the earlier Senate election. For the 1992 election, we discarded EXPENDITURES
92 since the lowest value, .140, was for COST/VOTE 92 and SPENDING EDGE
92.
D. REGRESSION
The final type of analysis which we completed had to do with regression.
This type of analysis is used to determine the strength of a relationship between
one or more independent variables to a dependent variable. In our tests we used
multiple regression since we wanted to see which of several independent
variables had the greatest effect on our dependent variable. Because only
continuous variables could be used in conducting this analysis, we recoded our
nominal variable, CLOSURE LIST, to make it a "dummy" variable named
CLOSURE. In essence, we assigned a value of one if an individual had a base in
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his district or State selected for closure; we assigned a value of zero if he did not.
Our independent variables were then analyzed with our dependent variable of
percent margin of victory for each given election year.
1. 1990 House Election vs 1989 Base Closures
In this election year, we crossed seven independent variables with the
dependent variable, % MARGIN 90 (See TABLE 29). The independent variables
were: % MARGIN 88, COST/VOTE 88, SPENDING EDGE 88, COST/VOTE 90,
SPENDING EDGE 90, CLOSURE, and TENURE 90. As explained in the
Correlation And Covariance section, we discarded EXPENDITURES 88 and
EXPENDITURES 90. From this analysis, we learn that the variable which had
the greatest effect on what an individual's percent margin of victory was
COST/VOTE 90 (standardized coefficient, -.519). Additionally, this effect is
absolutely not due to chance (P-Value, less than .0001). The variable which had
the next greatest effect on one's margin of victory, is % MARGIN 88
(standardized coefficient, .349). This effect is also not due to chance (P-Value,
less than .0001). The independent variable, CLOSURE, did not have an effect on
% MARGIN 90 (standardized coefficient, .014; P-Value, .7567). Still, the ANOVA
table shows that our regression table is a believable model, as a whole (P-Value,
less than .0001). Lastly, less than a third of the variation in % MARGIN 90 is
explainable by the independent variables collectively (R Squared, .284). To get a
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more complete picture, we then conducted the same regression analysis, but we
split it by those who won and those who lost (See Tables 30 and 31). As a result,
for the winners, the variable which had the greatest effect on percent margin of
victory was still COST/VOTE 90. However, the variable with the least effect
became CLOSURE (coefficient, .010). Furthermore, the model as a whole is still
believable (P-Value, less than .0001). For the losers, the variables with the
greatest effect were COST/VOTE 88 and % MARGIN 88 (coefficients, .971 and
.924, respectively); however, their effect is likely due to chance ( P-Values, .2952
and .2107). CLOSURE again had little to no effect (coefficient, .136; P-Value,
.7766).
2. 1992 House Election vs 1991 Base Closures
We completed a similar test in this election year; however, we changed our
dependent variable to % MARGIN 92. The independent variables included: %
MARGIN 90, COST/VOTE 90, SPENDING EDGE 90, COST/VOTE 92,
SPENDING EDGE 92, CLOSURE, and TENURE 92 (See TABLE 32). As
previously mentioned, we discarded the variables, EXPENDITURES 90 and
EXPENDITURES 92. The variable having the greatest effect on the dependent
variable was COST/VOTE 92 (standardized coefficient, -.807). Additionally, this
effect is not due to chance (P-Value, less than .0001). From the two House
elections it can be said that what an individual spent on the election, divided by
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the numbers of votes he received, was the most significant factor in effecting his
margin of victory for both elections. In this election, CLOSURE had the least
effect on one's margin of victory (coefficient, -.012). Furthermore, this effect is
surely due to chance (P-Value, .7869). Additionally, the ANOVA table proves
that this model, as a whole, is believable (P-Value, less than .0001).
Additionally, the model fits the 1992 House election a little better than it fit the
1990 House election (R Square, .407). After completing a split by analysis (See
TABLES 33 and 34), the variable which had the greatest effect on the winner's
percent margin of victory was still COST/VOTE 92 (coefficient, -.719). The effect
is absolutely not due to chance (P-Value, less than .0001). Again, CLOSURE had
the least effect (coefficient, .036) and the likelihood that this effect is due to
chance dropped by almost balf (P-Value, .4498). As a whole, the model is
believable (P-Value, less than .0001). The same can be said for the losers,
however, to different degrees. COST/VOTE 92 had the greatest effect
(coefficient, -.812); CLOSURE had the least (coefficient, -.048). In conclusion,
whether an individual won or lost, regardless of whether or not he ran in the
1990 or the 1992 House election, the independent variable, CLOSURE, had very
little, if any, effect on the overall outcome of the election.
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3. 1990 Senate Election vs 1989 Base Closures
Over in the Senate, we conducted similar regression analyses. However, as
briefly mentioned in the section, Correlation And Covariance, we substituted the
expenditures values for the spending edge values in both earlier Senate
elections. In the first category, our dependent variable was % MARGIN 90; our
independent variables were: '% MARGIN 84, EXPENDITURES 84, COST/VOTE
84, COST/VOTE 90, SPENDING EDGE 90, CLOSURE, and TENURE 90 (See
Table 35). Of those variables, COST/VOTE 90 had the greatest effect on percent
margin of victory (coefficient, -.585) and it is not likely due to chance (P-Value,
.0079). CLOSURE, on the other hand, had no effect (coefficient, -.013; P-Value,
.9421). The model has a high degree of believability (P-Value, .0310).
Furthermore, almost half of the variation in the percent margin variable is
explainable by the independent variables collectively (R Square, .470). Because
there were too few people who lost in this group, we were unable to complete
this analysis using the split by function.
4. 1992 Senate Election vs 1991 Base Closures
In this last group we changed the dependent variable to % MARGIN 92.
Our independent variables included: % MARGIN 86, EXPENDITURES 86,
COST/VOTE 86, COST/VOTE 92, SPENDING EDGE 92, CLOSURE, and
TENURE 92 (See TABLE 36). This time, however, TENURE 92 had the greatest
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effect on % MARGIN 92 (coefficient, -.858) and it is not due to chance (P-Value,
.0144). % MARGIN 86 had the second greatest effect which was also not due to
chance (coefficient, .819; P-Value, .0182, respectively). Interestingly, the
variables with dollar values did not have much of an effect. In fact,
COST/VOTE 86 had absolutely no effect (coefficient, -.004, P-Value, .9863). As
in the previous Senate election, CLOSURE also had no effect (standardized
coefficient, -.017; P-Value, .9386). Overall, from the ANOVA table, we can
determine that the model is believable (P-Value, .1468). Again, due to the
smaller number of observations in the Senate than in the House, we were unable
to perform a split by series to separate the winners from the losers. As in the
House, regardless of the election year, the independent variable, CLOSURE, did
not have much of an overall effect on the outcome of an individual's
reelectability.
E. SUMMATION
As a result of the analyses conducted, we have clearly shown that despite
what the literature says, a Congressman's reelectability is not hurt if a base is
selected for closure in his district or State. The Contingency Tables showed us
that the relationship between an election and a base closure is not strong. While
there was a small relationship, perhaps one election, in the House elections, this
relationship was likely due to chance. In the Senate, there simply was no
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relationship. ANOVA showed us that in both House elections and one Senate
election, there was a modest difference (3-4%) in the percent margin of victory
between those who had a base selected for closure and those who did not.
However, in all cases, this difference was due to chance. Lastly, the Regression
Analysis told us that base closure did not have an effect on the outcome of an
election, regardless of whether it was for the House or the Senate and regardless
of whether the individual won or lost. Therefore, the reelectability of members
of Congress for those members having a base selected for closure is the same as




Despite what many political scientists such as Lindsay and Mayhew claim, the
results of our research on the 1989 and 1991 base closure process clearly prove
that the reelectability of Congressmen who had a base selected for clcsure is not
substantively different than the reelectability for the other members of Congress.
In the elections we analyzed, how much a member spent per vote to get
reelected played the most important part in achieving that objective, whether he
had a base selected for closure or not. The fact that a candidate had a base
selected for closure mattered little in his attempt at reelection. Congress has
been able to act, as a whole, to render individual members blame-proof, with
maneuvers such as the Defense Savings Act, and has passed legislation that
would ordinarily be considered politically dangerous.
It appears that Congress is willing to give up power to get politically
dangerous, but necessary, legislation passed and still get reelected. Congress
used the not so uncommon "blame avoidance" for base closures just as it has
used it for other issues in the past. Representative Kolbe said on the floor, "It has
been talked about that this is a bad delegation of power by the Congress of our
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authority here. But the fact is Congress has done this many times in the past...""
The fact that members of the United States Congress have legislated their power
away, contrary to what the literature says about how legislators act, supports the
contention that they are driven by a desire to be reelected. Even though
Congress felt that it was politically dangerous to allow bases to close, they knew
that it had to be done if they were going to be able to cut back on federal
government expenditures. However, the parochial imperative prevented them
from fulfilling the obligation. Thus, they resorted to delegating their powers
away, as they have done before.
Our examination of the results obtained from four types of analysis serve as
concrete evidence to support our thesis that the reelectability of members of
Congress is not hurt by base closures. On the contrary, of all the independent
variables we used, we saw that base closures tended to have the least effect on a
member's reelectability. Before ending this discussion of our research, it is
necessary to identify any potential errors in logic in our research. The first
questionable issue is whether or not it is too early to determine if base closures
had any impact on a member's reelectability. For instance, several bases selected
for closure in the 1989 round are still open. It takes roughly four to seven years
--0
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to close a base, so, if constituents "punish" their elected representative by not
reelecting him, does this occur at the time of selection for closure, at the time of
the actual closure, or some time later when the economic impact takes effect?
Since some of the bases from the first round are now completely closed, we
propose that any future study of this subject consider those bases and their
respective members of Congress first. On the other hand, this simply may not
make a difference.
Second, as new rounds of the base closure process ensue, succeeding studies
should also include subsequent elections. While no two elections will be exactly
the same, the variables we used will consistently be pertinent in future case
studies. Elections then, as now, will be measured in terms of money and
margins. However, other election year-specific variables, such as the House
check scandal, will be relevant on a much narrower scope. Circumstances will
dictate the extent of the use of these variables.
Perhaps the most important lesson learned is that it appears that Congress
can manipulate the process to render individual members blame-proof. If this is
true, then might it not also be possible for Congress to address other politically





1990 !1OUSE ELECTION vs 1989 BASE CLOSURES









Observed Frequencies for ELECTION 90, CLOSURE LIST
YES N1 Totals
V4N 10 371 381
LOST 1 15 16N/A 1 37 3N/ 38
Totals 12 423 435
Percents of Column Totals for ELECTION 90, CLOSURE MST
YES INO Totals
S 83.333 87.707 87.586
LOST 8.333 3.546 3.678
N/A 8.333 8.747 8.736
Totals 100.000 100.000 100.000
Expected Values for ELECTION 90, CLOSURE UST
YES N:O Totals
YWCN 10.510 370.490 381.000
LOST .441 15.559 16.000
N/A 1.048 36.952 38.000




1992 HOUSE ELECTION vs 1991 BASE CLOSURES









Observed Frequencies for ELECTION 92, CLOSURE LIST
YES WO Totals
VVCN 14 3101 324
LOST 4 4L 0 4 4
N/A 4 63 67
Totals 22 413 435
Percents of Column Totals for ELECTION 92, CLOSURE LIST
YES N:) Totals
WCN 63.636 75.061 74.483
LOST 818182 9.685 10.115
N/A 18.182 15.254 15.402
Totals 100.000 100.000 100.000
Expected Values for ELECTION 92, CLOSURE LIST
YES N:) Totals
WCN 16.386 307.614 324.000
LOST 2.225 41.775 44.000
N/A 3.389 63.611 67.000




1990 SENATE ELECTION vs 1989 BASE CLOSURES









Observed Frequencies for ELECTION 90, CLOSURE UST
YES WO Totals[IJ426 30
LOST • 1
N/A 3
Totals 5 29 34
Percents of Column Totals for ELECTION 90, CLOSURE UST
YES N:) Totals
WN 80.000 89.655 88.235
LOST 0.000 3.448 2.941
N/A 20.000 6.897 8.824
Totals 100.000 100.000 100.000
Expected Values for ELECTION 90, CLOSURE LIST
YES N: Totals
WCN ,4.412 25.588 30.000
LOST .147 .853 1.000
N/A .441 2.559 3.000




1992 SENATE ELECTION vs 1991 BASE CLOSURES









Observed Frequencies for ELECTION 92, CLOSURE UST
YES ND Totals
WCN 7 17 24
LOST 1 4 5
N/A 3 3 6
Totals 11 24 35
Percents of Column Totals for ELECTION 92, CLOSURE MST
YES ND Totals
N 63.636 70.833 68.571
LOST 9.091 16.667 14.286
N/A 27.273 12.500 17.143
Totals 100.000 100.000 100.000
Expected Values for ELECTION 92, CLOSURE LIST
YES N: Totals
N 7.543 16.457 24.000
LOST 1.571 3.429 5.000
N/A 1.886 4.114 6.000




1990 HOUSE ELECTION vs 1989 BASE CLOSURES









Cly. Cor. Chi Square .997
Cty. Cor. P-Value .3181
Fisher's Exact P-Value .2371
Observed Frequencies for CLOSURE UST, PARTY
FEP DEM Totals
YES 7Z 5 12
N: 6 423
Totals 175 260 435
Percents of Column Totals for CLOSURE LIST, PARTY
FEP DEM Totals
YES 1 4001 .923 2.759
N 96.000 198.077 97.241
Totals 100.000 100.000 100.000
Expected Values for CLOSURE LIST, PARTY
REP DEM Totals
YES 1 4.8281 7.172j1 12.000
0 1170.172 1252.828 423.000




1992 HOUSE ELECTION vs 1991 BASE CLOSURES









Observed Frequencies for CLOSURE UST, PARTY
F6: DEM IND Totals
YES 8 1422
F 1581 4 1 413
Totals 166 268 1 435
Percents of Column Totals for CLOSURE UST, PARTY
FIP DEM IND Totals
YES 1 4.8191 5.2241 0.000 5.057
N: 95.181 94.776 100.000 94.943
Totals 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000
Expected Values for CLOSURE UST, PARTY
REP DEM IND Totals
YES 1 8.3951I 13.5541I .051]I 22.000
N: 157.605 254.446 .949 413.000




1990 SENATE ELECTION vs 1989 BASE CLOSURES









Cty. Cor. Chi Square 0.000
Cty. Cor. P-Value >.9999
Fisher's Exact P-Value .6678
Observed Frequencies for CLOSURE LIST, PARTY
:EP DEM Totals
YES 3 2 5
N 1 141 15 29
Totals 17 17 34
Percents of Column Totals for CLOSURE LIST, PARTY
REP DEM Totals
YES 17.647 11.765 14.706
N [ 82.353 88.2351 85.294
Totals 100.000 100.000 100.000
Expected Values for CLOSURE UST, PARTY
:P DBEM Totals
YES 2.500 2.50 5.000
N: 14.500 14.500 29.000




1992 SENATE ELECTION vs 1991 BASE CLOSURES













Cty. Cor. Chi Square 0.000
Cty. Cor. P-Value >.9999
Fisher's Exact P-Value L. 99999
Observed Frequencies for CLOSURE UST, PARTY
REP DEM Totals
YES 51 61 11
N:) 1 10 414 24
Totals 15 20 35
Percents of Column Totals for CLOSURE LIST, PARTY
REP DEM Totals
YES 33.333 30.00J 31.429
o 166.66717000 68.571
Totals 100.000 100.000 100.000
Expected Values for CLOSURE UST, PARTY
FEP DEM Totals
YES 4.714 6L2861 11.000
10 10.286 13.714- 24.000




1990 HOUSE ELECTION vs 1989 BASE CLOSURES
ANOVA Table for % MARGIN 90
CF Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value
CLOSURE LIST 1 1 157.173 157.1731 .155 1 .6936
Residual 395 399460.827 1011.293
Model II estimate of between component variance:.
38 cases were omitted due to missing values.
Means Table for % MARGIN 90
Effect: CLOSURE UST
Count Mean Std. Dev. Sd. Err.
YES I 11 37.2731 37.4841 11.302




1990 HOUSE ELECTION vs 1989 BASE CLOSURES
ANOVA Table for % MARGIN 90
Split By: ELECTION 90
Cell: WON
C Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value
CLOSURE LISTk 1i 18.0631 18.063 ,019 .89041
Residual 379 359875.674 949.540
Model II estimate of between component variance:•
Means Table for % MARGIN 90
Effect: CLOSURE UST
Split By: ELECTION 90
Cell: WON
Count Mean Std. Dev. Std. Err.
YES 10 41.700 36.353 11.496
N03 371 43.062 30.667 1.592
ANOVA Table for % MARGIN 90
Split By: ELECTION 90
Cell: LOST
OF Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value
CLOSURE LIST 1 .0671 .067 .001 .9749
Residual 114 910.933 65.067
Model II estimate of between component variance: •
Means Table for % MARGIN 90
Effect: CLOSURE UST
Split By: ELECTION 90
Cell: LOST
Count Mean Std. Dev. Std. Err.
YES 1 1-7.0001 •




1990 HOUSE ELECTION vs 1989 BASE CLOSURES
ANOVA Table for EXPENDITURES 90
o1 Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value
ELECTION 90 r71 1078217.172 11078217.172 117.490 ~.O1
Residual 394 24288625.333 61646.257
Model II estimate of between component variance: 35219.78
39 cases were omitted due to missing values.
Means Table for EXPENDITURES 90
Effect: ELECTION 90
Count Mean Std. Dev. Std. Err.
WON 381 392.000 250.558 12.836
LOST 15 665.3331 175.744 45.377
NIA 0 0 1 1
ANOVA Table for COSTNOTE 90
OF Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value
ELECTION 90 )I 11 222.821 222.8211 22.297 I <.00011
Residual 387 3867.465 9.993
Model II estimate of between component variance: 7.885
46 cases were omitted duo to missing values.
Means Table for COSTNOTE 90
Effect: ELECTION 90
Count Mean Std. Dev. Std. Err.
WON 375 4.375 3.159 .163
LOST'I 1418.4381 3.2201 .8619
N/A 0 - I a
ANOVA Table for SPENDING EDGE 90
0F Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value
ELECTIONgO 90 140157.698 140157.698 1 2.860 1 .0916
Residual 394 19309998.211 49010.148
Model II estimate of between component variance: 3157.868
39 cases were omitled due to missing values.
Means Table for SPENDING EDGE 90
Effect: ELECTION 90
Count Mean Std. Dev. Std. Err.
W 381 319.415 222.974 11.423
LOST 15 220.8671 172.6551 44.579




1990 HOUSE ELECTION vs 1989 BASE CLOSURES
ANOVA Table for TENURE 90
OF Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value
ELECTION 90 2 1 131.8291 65.9151 1.1081 .33111
Residual 432 25692.713 59.474
Model 11 estimate of between component variance: .132
Means Table for TENURE 90
Effect: ELECTION 90
Count Mean Std. Dev. Std. Err.ICN 381 11.512 7.799 .400
LOST 16 9.1881 7.2221 1.806
N/A 38 12.605 6.973 1.131
Fisher'es PLSD for TENURE 90
Effect: ELECTION 90
SIgnIfIcance Level: 5 %
Mean Diff. Crit. Diff P-Value
WON, LOST 2.324 3.868 .2382
WON, N/A -1.093 2.579 .4050




1992 HOUSE ELECTION vs 1991 BASE CLOSURES
ANOVA Table for % MARGIN 92
()= Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value
CLOSURE LISTI 1 61.9881 61.988 .097 L.7554
Residual 1366 233446.697 637.833
Model II estimate of between component variance:.
67 cases were omitted due to missing values.
Means Table for % MARGIN 92
Effect: CLOSURE LIST
Count Mean Std. Dev. Std. Err.
YES 18 26.5001 26.107 6.153




1992 HOUSE ELECTION vs 1991 BASE CLOSURES
ANOVA Table for % MARGIN 92
Split By: ELECTION 92
Cell: WON
OF Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value
CLOSURE LIST 1 1 168.6141 168.6141 347 .55601
Residual 322 156250.012 485.248
Model II estimate of between component variance: •
Means Table for % MARGIN 92
Effect: CLOSURE MST
Split By: ELECTION 92
Cell: WON
Count Mean Std. Dev. Std. Err.
YESI 141 38.9291 17.9551 4.7991
K) 310 33.381 22.183 1.260
ANOVA Table for % MARGIN 92
Split By: ELECTION 92
Cell: LOST
OF Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value
CLOSURE LIST 1 .1111 .111 .001 .9694
Residual 42 3133.775 74.614
Model II estimate of between component variance:•
Means Table for % MARGIN 92
Effect: CLOSURE UST
Split By: ELECTION 92
Cell: LOST
Count Mean Std. Dev. Std. Err.
YES 1 4 1 -10.000 1 13.466 6.733




1992 HOUSE ELECTION vs 1991 BASE CLOSURES
ANOVA Table for EXPENDITURES 92
OF Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value
ELECTION92 1 : 2240679.859 12240679.859 171.422 C.0001
Residual 345 44370315.784 128609.611
Model II estmate of between component variance: 49173.938
88 cases were omitted due to miskng values.
Means Table for EXPENDITURES 92
Effect: ELECTION 92
Count Mean Std. Dev. Std. Err.
WVN 324 563.380 358.882 19.938
LOST 23 886.391 354.779 73.977
N/A 0
ANOVA Table for COSTNOTE 02
1F Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value
ELECTION 92 I[ I 320.731 320.731 132.893 I <.0001i
Residual 345 3363.998 9.751
Model II estimate of between component variance: 7.24
88 cases were omitted due to missing values.
Means Table for COST/VOTE 92
Effect: ELECTION 92
Count Mean Std. Dev. Std. Err.
WCN 324 4.2021 30831 .171
LOST 23 8.067 3.656 .762
N/A 0 - 1 1
ANOVA Table for SPENDING EDGE 92
OF Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value
ELECTION 92 111 67423.376 167423.376 1 64 .47
Residual 345 38506833.448 111614.010
Model If estimate of between component variance:.
88 cases were omitted due to missing values.
Means Table for SPENDING EDGE 92
Effect: ELECTION 92
Count Mean Sid. Dev. Std. Err.
VYC 324 424.901 327.818 18.212





1992 HOUSE ELECTION vs 1991 BASE CLOSURES
ANOVA Table for TENURE 92
OF Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value
ELECTION 92 2 1254.3031 627.152 9.751 1 < 0001 1
Residual 432 27786.032 64.320
Model II estimate of between component variance: 6.292
Means Table for TENURE 92
Effect: ELECTION 92
Count Mean Std. Dev. Std. Err.
VCIN 324 11.1301 8.1051 .450
LOST 44 12.114 6.427 .969
N/A 67 15.881 8.518 1.041
Fleher's PLSD for TENURE 92
Effect: ELECTION 92
Significance Level: 5; %
Mean Diff. Crit. Diff P-Value
WON, LOST -.984 2.533 .44 55
WON, NWA -4.751 2.116 5 .0001 S




1990 SENATE ELECTION vs 1989 BASE CLOSURES
ANOVA Table for % MARGIN 90
OF Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value
CLOSURE LIST " 198.882 198.8821 .206 .6532
Residual 29 27980.667 964.851,
Model II estimate of between component variance: •
3 cases were omitted due to missing values.
Means Table for % MARGIN 90
Effect: CLOSURE UST
Count Mean Std. Dev. Std. Err.
YES 4 128.0001 26.281 1 13.140




1990 SENATE ELECTION vs 1989 BASE CLOSURES
ANOVA Table for % MARGIN 90
Split By: ELECTION 90
Cell: WON
OF Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value
CLOSURELISTI 1 280.8001 280.8001 .2971 4
Res"dul 28 26516.000 947.000
Model II estimate of between component variance:•
Meana Table for % MARGIN 90
Effect: CLOSURE UST
Split By: ELECTION 90
Cell: WON
Count Mean Std. Dev. Std. Err.
YES 1 4 128.000 1 26.2811 13.140 1
NDI 26137.0001 31.269 6.132
ANOVA Table for % MARGIN 90
Split By: ELECTION 90
Cell: LOST
There were not enough observations to compute this result.
Means Table for % MARGIN 90
Effect: CLOSURE UST
Split By: ELECTION 90
Cell: LOST




1990 SENATE ELECTION vs 1989 BASE CLOSURES
ANOVA Table for EXPENDITURES 90
OF Sum of Square$ Mean Square F-Value P-Value
ELECTIONSgoI1 1 4488592.904 14466592.904 1.265 .68109Residual 29 489522362.967 16880081.482
Model II estimate of between conponent variance:.
3 cases were omitted due to miseing valuek.
Means Table for EXPENDITURES 90
Effect: ELECTION 90
Count Mean Sid. Dev. Sid. Err.
WOCNI 30 1 4072.633 14108.538 1750.113 1
LOST 1 1221.0001
N/A 0
ANOVA Table for COSTNOTE 90
OF Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Vaiue
ELECTioNoo Fi .2501 .250 1 .009 1 .9254
Residual 291 810.866 27.981
Model II estimlae of between component variance:.
3 cases were omitted due to missig values.
Means Table for COSTNOTE 90
Effect: ELECTION 90
Count Mean Std. Dev. Std. Err.
VOJ 30 7.708 5.288 .965
LOST- 1 7.200 I •
NIA 01
ANOVA Table for SPENDING EDGE 90
CF Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value
ELECTIONO go 1 I 5443357.527 1 5443357.527 1 .5991I .445
Residual 29 263501500.667 19086258.644
Model II estimate of between component variance: .
3 cases were omitted due to missing values.
Means Table for SPENDING EDGE 90
Effect: ELECTION 90
Count Mean Std. Dev. Std. Err.






1990 SENATE ELECTION vs 1989 BASE CLOSURES
ANOVA Table for TENURE 90
OF Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value
ELECTION go 2 3.0981 1.5491 .028 .9720
Residual 31 1690.667 54.538
Model II estimate of between component variance:•
Means Table for TENURE 90
Effect: ELECTION 90
Count Mean Std. 0ev. Std. Err.
WCN 30 13.333 7.581 1.384
LOST 1 12.0001 *I
N/A 3 14.000 3.464 2.000
Fisher's PLSD for TENURE 90
Effect: ELECTION 90
Significance Level: 6 %
Mean Diff. Crit. 1iff P-Value
WON, LOST 1.333 15.311 .8602j
WON, N/A -. 667 9.120 .8825




1992 SENATE ELECTION vs 1991 BASE CLOSURES
ANOVA Table for % MARGIN 92
DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value
CLOSURE LISTI 11 6.5771 6.5771 .0231 .8816
Residual 27 7848.113 290.6711
Model II estimate of between component variance:.
6 cases were omitted due to missing values.
Means Table for % MARGIN 92
Effect: CLOSURE MST
Count Mean Std. Dev. Std. Err.
YES 8 16.125 22.184 7.843




1992 SENATE ELECTION vs 1991 BASE CLOSURES
ANOVA Table for % MARGIN 92
Spilt By: ELECTION 92
Cell: WON
OF Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value
CLOSURE LIST I 1 1 10.6011 10.6011 .0531 .8208
Residual 22 4435.899 201.632
Model II estimate of between component variance:.
Means Table for % MARGIN 92
Effect: CLOSURE UST
Split By: ELECTION 92
Cell: WON
Count Mean Std. Day. Std. Err.
YES 7 120.714 19.431 7.344
:10 [ 7 22.176 11.647 2.825
ANOVA Table for % MARGIN 92
Split By: ELECTION 92
Cell: LOST
OF Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value
CLOSURE LISTI 11 115.2001 115.200 24.6861 .0157
Residual 3 14.000 4.667
Model II estimate of between component variance: 69.083
Means Table for % MARGIN 92
Effect: CLOSURE MST
Split By: ELECTION 92
Cell: LOST
Count Mean Std. Day. Std. Err.
YES 1 1-16.0001 0




1992 SENATE ELECTION vs 1991 BASE CLOSURES
ANOVA Table for EXPENDITURES 92
OF Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value
ELECTION 92 -I I 2288300.292 1 2288300.292 I.377 .54I
Residual 26 157916520.958 6073712.345
Model II estimate of between component variance:•
7 cases were omitted due to mising values.
Means Table for EXPENDITURES 92
Effect: ELECTION 92
Count Mean Std. Dev. Std. Err.
MIN 24 4097.542 2536.771 517.816
LOST 4 4914.500 1817.215 908.607
N/A 0 1 . .
ANOVA Table for COSTNOTE 92
OF Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value
ELECTION 92r-1 29.4341 29.4341 .8751 .3583
Residual 2 874.930 33.851
Model II estimate of between component variance:•
7 cases were omitted due to missing values.
Means Table for COSTNOTE 92
Effect: ELECTION 92
Count Mean Std. 0ev. Std. Err.
V40N 24 7.045 6.079 1.241
LOST 4 4.115 2.886 1.443
N/A 0 * I *
ANOVA Table for SPENDING EDGE 92
OF Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value
ELECTION92[1 1 13007631.006 113007631.0061 6.9031 .0142
Residual 26 48994005.958 1884384.845
Model II estimate of between component variance: 1622140.065
7 cases were omitted due to missing values.
Means Table for SPENDING EDGE 92
Effect: ELECTION 92
Count Mean Std. Oev. Std. Err.
WCN 24 2798.29241250-.4544 25-5.2481





1992 SENATE ELECTION vs 1991 BASE CLOSURES
ANOVA Table for TENURE 92
OF Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value
ELECTION 92 21 123.8421 61.9211 1.1811 .3201
Residual 32 1678.158 52.442
Model II estimate of between component varianoe: 1.128
Means Table for TENURE 92
Effect: ELECTION 92
Count Mean Std. Dev. Std. Err.
C 24 12.708 7.647 1.561
LOST 5 7.4001 4.6691 2.088
N/A 6 13.000 7.014 2.864
Fishers PLSD for TENURE 92
Effect: ELECTION 92
Significance Level: 5 %
Mean Diff. Crit. Diff P-Value
WON, LOST 5.308 7.251 .1457
WON, N/A -.292 6.733 .9302




FOR 1990 HOUSE ELECTION
Correlation Matrix
EXPENDITURES 88 COSTNOTE 88 SPENDING EDGE 88
EXPENDITURES 88 1.000 .921 .614
COSTNOTE 88 .921 1.000 .489
SPENDING EDGE 88 .614 .489 1.000
403 observations were used in this computation.
32 cases were omitted due to missing values.
Correlation Matrix
EXPENDITURES 90 COSTNOTE 90 SPENDING EDGE 90
EXPENDITURES 90 1.000 .892 .766
COSTNOTE 90 .892 1.000 .683
SPENDING EDGE gO .766 .683 1.000
389 observations were used in this computation.




FOR 1992 HOUSE ELECTION
Correlation Matrix
EXPENDITURES 90 COSTNOTE 90 SPENDING EDGE 90
EXPENDITURES 9o 1.000 .884 .640
COSTNOTE go .884 1.0001 .599
SPENDING EDGE 90 .640 .5991 1.000
425 observations were used In this computation.
10 cases were omitted due to missing values.
Correlation Matrix
EXPENDITURES 92 COSTNOTE 92 SPENDING EDGE 92
EXPENDITURES 92 1.000 .885 .754
COSTNOTE 92 .885 1.000 .670
SPENDING EDGE 92 .754 .670 1.000
347 observations were used in this computation.




FOR 1990 SENATE ELECTION
Correlation Matrix
EXPENDITURES 84 COSTNOTE 84 SPENDING EDGE 84
EXPENDITURES 84 1.000 .628 .819
COSTNOTE 84 .6281 1.000-1 .773
SPENDING EDGE 84 .819 .773 1.000
33 observations were used in this computation.
One case was omitted due to missing values.
Correlation Matrix
EXPENDITURES 90 COSTNOTE 90 SPENDING EDGE 90
EXPENDITURES gO 1.0001 .273 .894
COSTNOTE 90 .2731 1.0001 .230
SPENDING EDGE go .894 .230 1.000
31 observations were used in this computation.




FOR 1992 SENATE ELECTION
Correlation Matrix
EXPENDITURES 86 COSTNOTE 86 SPENDING EDGE 86
EXPENDITURES 86 1.000 -.003 .513
COSTNOTE 86 -.003 1.000 .039
SPENDING EDGE 86 .513 .039 1.000
34 observations were used in this computation.
One case was omitted due to missing values.
Correlation Matrix
EXPENDITURES 92 COSTNOTE 92 SPENDING EDGE 92
EXPENDITURES 92 1.000 -. 142 .578
COSTNOTE 92 -. 142 1.000 L .140
SPENDING EDGE 92 .578 .140 1.000
28 observations were used in this computation.




1990 HOUSE ELECTION vs 7 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Regression Summary





Adjusted R Squared .269
RMS Residual 2 5.695
ANOVA Table
% MARGIN 90 vs. 7 Independents
OF Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value
Regression 7 92262.688 13180.384 19.963 <.0001
Residual 353 233070.193 660.256
Total 360 325332.881
Regression Coefficients
% MARGIN 90 vs. 7 Independents
Coefficient Std. Error Std. Coeff. t-Value P-Value
Intercept 26.759 4.871 26.759 5.493 <.0001
%MARGIN88 .435 .069 .349 6.265 <.0001
COSTNOTE 88 2.995 .872 .235 3.435 .0007
SPENDING EDGE 88 .003 .008 .021 .346 .7298
COSTNOTE 90 -4.808 .636 -. 519 -7.560 <.0001
SPENDING EDGE g0 .017 .009 .124 1.786 .0749
CLOU 2.464 7.946 .014 .310 .7567




1990 HOUSE ELECTION WINNERS vs 7 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Regression Summary
% MARGIN 90 vs. 7 Independents






Adjusted R Squared .220
RMS Residual 25.838
ANOVA Table
% MARGIN 90 vs. 7 Independents
Split By: ELECTION 90
Cell: WON
OF Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value
Regression 7 69993.902 9999.129 14.978 <.0001
Residual 339 226315.649 667.598
Total 346 296309.550
Regression Coefficients
% MARGIN 90 vs. 7 Independents
Split By: ELECTION 90
Cell: WON
Coefficient Std. Error Std. Coeff. t-Value P-Value
Intercept 28.377 4.961 28.377 5.721 <.0001
%MARGIN88 .411 071 .336 5.821 <.0001
COSTNOTE 88 2.857 .893 .230 3.199 .0015
SPLNDING EDGE 88 .005 .008 .036 .563 .5735
COSTNOTE 90 -4.292 .732 -. 462 -5.862 <.0001
SPENDING EDGE 90 .009 .011 .072 .891 .3736
CLOSLFIE 1.747 8.336 .010 .210 .8341
TENURE90 .040 .189 .011 .213 .8313
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TABLE 31
REGRESSION1990 HOUSE ELECTION LOSERS vs 7 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Regression Summary
% MARGIN 90 vs. 7 Independents









% MARGIN 90 vs. 7 Independents
Split By: ELECTION 90
Cell: LOST
CF Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value
Regression 7 95.925 13.704 .509 .8012
Residual 6 I 161.5041 26.917
Total 13 257.429
Regression Coefficients
% MARGIN 90 vs. 7 Independents
Split By: ELECTION 90
Cell: LOST
Coefficient Std. Error Std. Coeff. t-Value P-Value
Intercept 
-15.052 8.529 -15.052 -1.765 .1280
% MARGIN 88 .292 .208 .924 1.401 .2107
COSTNOTE 88 1.968 1.716 .971 1.147 .2952
SPENDING EDGE 88 -. 012 .021 -. 486 -. 552 .6008
COSTNOTE 90 -.475 .623 -. 344 -. 763 .4744
SPENDING EDGE go .015 .017 .532 .895 .4055
CLQOSLE 2.261 7.617 .136 .297 .7766
TENURE 90 




1992 HOUSE ELECTION vs 7 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Regression Summary





Adjusted R Squared .394
RMS Residual 18.321
ANOVA Table
% MARGIN 92 vs. 7 Independents
OF Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value
Regression 7 76238.491 10891.213 32.449 <.0001
Residual 331 111098.358 335.645
Total 338 187336.850
Regression Coefficients
% MARGIN 92 vs. 7 Independents
Coefficient Std. Error Std. Coeff. t-Value P-Value
Intercept 29.453 2.963 29.453 9.940 <.0001
% MARGIN 90 .221 .035 .291 6.248 <.0001
COSTNOTE 90 1.663 .459 .225 3.623 .0003
SPENDING EDGE go .004 .005 .044 .744 .4573
COSTNOTE 92 -5.773 .432 -.807 -13.376 <.0001
SPENDING EDGE92 .026 .004 .371 5.900 <.0001
CLOSJFIE -1.240 4.584 -. 012 -. 271 .7869




1992 HOUSE ELECTION WINNERS vs 7 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Regression Summary
% MARGIN 92 vs. 7 Independents






Adjusted R Squared .316
RMS Residual 18.177
ANOVA Table
% MARGIN 92 vs. 7 Independents
Split By: ELECTION 92
Cell: WON
!F Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value
Regression 7 50488.411 7212.630 21.830 <.0001
Residual 308 101764.1801 330.4031 1
Total 315 152252.592
Regression Coefficients
% MARGIN 92 vs. 7 Independents
Split By: ELECTION 92
Cell: WON
Coefficient Std. Error Std. Coeff. t-Value P-Value
Intercept 30.310 3.014 30.310 10.058 <.0001
% MARGIN 90 .231 .036 .324 6.344 <.0001
COSTNOTE 90 1.471 .475 .216 3.099 .0021
SPENDING EDGE 90 .005 .006 .064 .968 .3337
OOSTNOTE92 -5.082 .499 -. 719 -10.193 <.0001
SPENDING EDGE 92 .020 .005 .303 4.234 <.0001
CLOSURE 3.790 5.008 .036 .757 .4498




1992 HOUSE ELECTION LOSERS vs 7 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Regression Summary
% MARGIN 92 vs. 7 Independents
Split By: ELECTION 92
Cell: LOST
Count 23
Num. Missing 2 1
R .617
R Squared .381
Adjusted R Squared .092
RMS Residual 4.867
ANOVA Table
% MARGIN 92 vs. 7 Independents
Split By: ELECTION 92
Cell: LOST
EF Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value
Regression 71 218.4781 31.211 1.318 .30781
Residual 151 355.261 1 23.684
Total 22 573.739
Regression Coefficients
% MARGIN 92 vs. 7 Independents
Split By: ELECTION 92
Cell: LOST
Coefficient Std. Error Std. Coeff. t-Value P-Value
Intercept -3.265 5.101 -3.265 -.640 .5318
% MARGIN 90 .041 .043 .263 .939 .3624
0OSTNOTE 90 1.042 .618 .577 1.688 .1122
SPENDING EDGE 90 -. 001 .008 -. 057 -. 160 .8752
COSTNOTE 92 -1.134 .554 -. 812 -2.048 .0585
SPENDING EDGE 92 .005 .005 .368 .916 .3739
CLO.JFE -. 718 3.680 -.048 -. 195 .8479




1990 SENATE ELECTION vs 7 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Regression Summary





Adjusted R Squared .301
RMS Residual 25.741
ANOVA Table
% MARGIN 90 vs. 7 Independents
OF Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value
Regression 7 12926.032 1846.576 2.787 .0310
Residual 22 14577.3351 662.606
Total 29 27503.367
Regression Coefficients
% MARGIN 90 vs. 7 Independents
Coefficient Std. Error Std. Coeff. t-Value P-Value
Intercept 42.326 17.227 42.326 2.457 .0224
% MARGIN 84 .565 .297 .380 1.905 .0700
EXPENDiTURES 84 -. 002 .003 -. 206 -.514 .6124
COSTNOTE 84 2.082 1.564 .412 1.331 .1967
COSTNOTE 90 -3.408 1.166 -. 585 -2.922 .0079
SPENDING EDGE go -7.094E-5 .003 -. 007 -. 022 .9824
CLOSURE -1.171 15.937 -.013 -.073 .9421




1992 SENATE ELECTION vs 7 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Regression Summary





Adjusted R Squared .176
RMS Residual 14.097
ANOVA Table
% MARGIN 92 vs. 7 Independents
OF Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value
Regression 7 2497.621 356.803 1.795 .1468
Residual I 19 3775.7866 198.726
Total 26 6273.407
Regression Coefficients
% MARGIN 92 vs. 7 independents
Coefficient Std. Error Std. Coeff. t-Value P-Value
Intercept 25.439 9.300 25.439 2.735 .0131
% MARGIN 86 .892 .345 .819 2.585 .0182
EXPENDITURES 86 -. 002 .002 -. 362 -1.285 .2142
COSTNOTE 86 -. 013 .750 -.004 -. 017 .9863
COSTNOTE 92 .320 .743 .120 .431 .6713
SPENDING EDGE 92 .002 .003 .165 .590 .5619
CLC -. 587 7.517 -.017 -. 078 .9386
TENURE 92 -1.798 .668 -. 858 -2.693 .0144
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